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Coricelli  and  Rocha  compa.e  the  implementation  stage of refonr  '-hese  include  the unfreezing  of
of  two apparently  similar  stabilization  programs  nominal  variables  and resolving  the critical
by two  reforming  socialist  countries,  launched  structural  problems  affectinig both economies.
two weeks  apart (December  1989 in Yugoslavia
and January  1990 in Poland).  Coricelli  and  Rocha conclude  that  the
microfoundations of socialist and market ccono-
They  investigate  possible  differences  under-  mies are clearly  dif'Tercnt. These  dif'ferences
lying  the apparently  similar  programs  that  may  imply  that in socialist  economnies the case  for
account  for the better  initial  performance  of  including  incomes  policy  in stabilization  pro-
Yugoslavia's  program  (a sharper  reductioni of'  grams  may  be stroniger.  Dii'ffeent
inflation  with smaller  losses  in output).  microfoundations  also imply  tihat the  model  of
sequencing  traditionally  applied  to Lalin  Ameni-
The authors  identify  significant  differences  can countries  - where  structural  issues  are
in initial  conditions  in the two countries  as  cell  relegated  to later stages  of Ihe adjustment
as the sequence  and degree  of some  policy  programs  - does  not seem to apply  to rel'onring
measures.  These  differences  may  explain  the  socialist  counlries,  where  stabilization  and
difference  in the early  results.  structural  reforms  are much  more closely  inter-
twined.
They  also  identify  the most  importantl issues
the two  countries  must  address  in the second
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Dissatisfaction  with their  performance  and  concern  over the  acceleration
of inflation  led  the  governments  3f  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  to implement
stabilization cum restructuring programs  at the end of 1989.  Their programs,
which  they launched  at approximately  the  same  time (December  18 in  Yugoslavia
and  January  1  in Poland),  comprise  measures  designed  not only to stabilize
inflation  at low  levels  but  also to  change  the  structure  of their  economic
systems.
The  stabilization  components  of both  programs  would ordinarily  be
classified  as heterodox,  since  they  include  incomes  policy  measures  in
addition  to a significant  fiscal  adjustment,  the  imposition  of credit  controls
and the  relaxation  of exchange  rate  and  trade  controls. The restructuring
components  of the  two  programs  also  share  some  similarities.  Both attempt  to
fose  inefficient  enterprises  into  bankruptcy,  albeit  through  different
methods. However,  in neither  case is  there  a clearly  defined  strategy  to  deal
with bankrupt  enterprises,  including  of the  precise  role of  privatization  in
the  overall  reform  strategy. In fact,  both  countries  are still  elaborating
several  aspects  of their  restructuring  components.
Both  programs  brought  about  a substantial  reduction  in inflation  in the
first  semester  of 1990  without  recourse  to  widespread  price  controls. In the
case  of Poland,  inflation  was reduced  from  a peak of 78 percent  in  January  to
3.5  percent  in  June.  In the  case  of Yuposlavia,  inflation  went from  a peak  of
60 percent  in December  1989  to almost  0 percent  in May  and  June 1990. The
performance  of the two  programs  in the  second  semester  of 1990  was less
satisfactory,  with  monthly  inflation  rates  of around  5 percent  in  Poland  and
ranging  between  3 and  8 percent  in  Yugoslavia.
Both  countries  experienced  a sharp  contraction  in economic  activity
following  the implementation  of their  programs. During  1990,  real  GDP  fell  by
12.5  and  7.5  percent  in Poland  and  Yugoslavia,  respectively. The  contraction5
of activity  was particularly  strong  in  the  industrial  sector,  as indicated  by
negative  growth  rates  of 20 and 10  percent 9 respectively.  Although  the  output
contraction Was concentrated in the first semester of  19909 the prospects for
a sustained  resumption  of growth  are still  uncertain  in  both countries.
The  implementation  of two  apparently  similar  programs  by two  reforming
socialist  countries  at  almost  the  same  time  has  produced  great  interest  in  a
comparative  analysis  of their  design,  performance  and  sustainability.  Such  ia
the  objective  of  this  paper.  To  this  end,  the  paper  investigates  the  possible
differences  that  underlie  the  similarities  of the  two  programs,  and  that  may
account for the better initial performance of Yugoslavia's  program  (a  sharper
reduction  of inflation  with smaller  output  losses). The  paper  identifies
significant  differences  in initial  conditions  in the  two  countries,  as  well as
in the  sequence  and degree  of some  policy  measures. These  differences  may
explain  the  differences  in the  early  results. Finally,  the  paper  identifies
the  most important  issues  that  the  two  countries  will have to address  in the
second  stage  of their  programs. These  include  the  unfreezing  of  nominal
variables  and  resolution  of the  critical  structural  problems  affecting  both
economies.
The  next section  provides  some  background  iaformation  on inflation  in the
two  countries  during  the  1980s. The following  section  examines  the  conditions
in the  two  economies  before  stabilization.  A comparison  of the  components  of
the  two  programs  is presented  in  the  subsequent  section,  followed  by a section
that  analyzes  the  initial  results  of the  programs  and  points  to the  possible
causes  of the  more severe  recession  in Poland. It also identifies  the  likely
causes  of the  revival  of inflation  in  Yugoslavia  during  the  second  semester  of
1990.  The  final  section  assesses  the  main issues  facing  the second  stage  of
the  reform  in the two  countries. Much  more detailed  analyses  of the  two
programs  appear  in the  two  appendices  (appendix  A  deals  with Poland,  appendix
B  with Yugoslavia).6
Background
The  histories  of  inflation  in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  during  the  last
decade  are  quite  different.  As shown  in  figure  19  inflation  in  Poland  was
more  erratic  than  that  in  Yugoslavia.  The  dominant  feature  in  the  first  half
of  the  decade  in  Poland  was  a  jump  in  1981-82,  while  in  the  second  half
inflation  showed  an  upward  trend  until  1988,  followed  by  another  jump  in  1989
when  it  reached  700  percent.  In  Yugoslavia  inflation  was  more  or  less  stable
until  1983. After  that  year  it  accelerated  almost  continuously,  reaching
2,700  percent  in  1989. In  general,  the  rates  of  inflation  in  Yugoslavia  were
much  higher  than  in  Poland  (except  in  1982)  and  the  OECD  average  for  the
decade.
These  differences  in  the  path  of  inflation  reflect  in  part  differences  in
the  structure  of  the  two  economies.  Until  the  early  1980s  Poland  had  a
centrally  planned  economy,  when  it  initiated  a  gradual  decentralization.
Yugoslavia  had  already  replaced  its  central  planning  with  a system  of  self-
management  in  the  early  1960s.  As  a  result,  there  was  much  less  interference
in  the  price  system  in  Yugoslavia.  Unlike  in  Poland,  price  controls  in
Yugoslavia  were  rarely  strong  enough  to  repress  inflation. In  fact,  they
bore  a  greater  resemblance  to  the  controls  prevailing  in  other  high  inflation
countries  such  as  Brazil  (which  has  always  had  controls  of  some  sort).
The  phenomenon  of  high  inflation  in  Yugoslavia  was  closely  associated
with  the  turnaround  in  the  current  account  during  the  1980s--typically
inflation  accelerates  as  the  current  account  shifts  from  a deficit  to  an
increasing  surplus.  Two  major  factors  underlay  the  close  association  between
inflation  and  the  current  account  in  Yugoslavia.  First,  the  need  to  reduce
the  real  wage  to  levels  consistent  with  a  given  depreciated  real  exchange  rate
required  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  inflation--the  Pazos-Simonsen  mechanism
(see  Dornbusch  1987;  Pazos  1978;  and  Simonsen  1989).  This  factor  became  more
important  at  the  end  of  the  decade,  with  the  increase  in  real  wage  rigidity
occurring  after  the  formal  introduction  of  wage  indexation  in  1987.7
Second,  the  conditions  that  prevailed  after  the  reversal  of  the  flows  in
external  financing  considerably  woreened  the  financial  situation  of  Yugoslav
enterprises,  where  the  fundamental  imbalances  of  the  Yugoslav  economy  were
located  (the  non-financial  public  sector  sn  surpluses  throughout  the  1980.).
Large  losses  in  foreign  exchange  as  a  result  of  interest  and  principal
payments,  combined  with  stagnant  output  and  increasing  overstaffing,  resulted
in  greater  enterprise  losses  in  the  1980s.  The  enterprise  imbalances  spilled
over  to  the  cAntral  bank,  since  the  latter  had  to  absorb  large  amounts  of
foreign  liabilities  in  an  effort  to  protect  the  enterprises  and  commercial
banks  from  even  greater  financial  difficulty.  As  a  result,  the  central  bank
ran  a  quasi-fiscal  deficit  that  became  an  independent  source  of  monetary
expansion.  The  various  attempts  at  stabilization  failed  to  address  the  hidden
losses  in  the  system  and  were  abandoned  soon  after  implementation.
Unlike  in  Yugoslavia,  the  non-financial  public  sector  in  Poland  ran
deficits  during  che  19809,  while  enterprise  accounts  showed  small  surpluses.
The  fiscal  deficits  were,  however,  kept  at  moderate  levels  (1-2  pes  -ent  of
gross  national  product  [GNP])  during  most  of  this  period,  the  exceptions  being
1981  and  1989,  when  the  deficit  was  much  larger  (10  percent  and  8  percent  of
GNP, respectively).  In  addition,  the  negative  transfer  of  resources  from
abroad,  as  measured  by  the  non-interest  current  account  surplus,  was  much
smaller  in  Poland  (2-3  percent  of  GNP)  than  it  was  in  Yugoslavia  (5-7  percent
of  GNP).'
These  numbers  indicate  that  the  underlying  rate  of  inflation  consistent
with  "fundamentals"  was  lower  in  the  case  of  Poland.  At  the  same  time,  the
much  stricter  price  controls  in  Poland  make  it  more  difficult  to  associate  the
movement  of  inflation  with  the  fundamentals. 2 In  addition,  there  is  some
I  In  fact,  Poland  managed  to  run  current  account  deficits
throughout  the  1980s,  while  Yugoslavia  ran  increasing  current  account
surpluses  after  1983.
2  Even  in  countries  with  open  inflation,  it  may  be  difficult  to
establish  a  continuously  close  relationship  between  budgetary  developments;
money  creation  and  inflation.  See  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1981),  Bruno  and
Fischer  (1987)  and  Drazen  and  Helpman  (1888)  for  theoretical  demonstrations  of8
aesociation  between  price  controls  and  budgetary  performance  via the
subsidies. For  instance,  the  outburst  of inflation  in 1982  coincided  with a
sharp  reductior  in the  deficit  from  1981  to 1982,  a phenomenon  that  occurred
again  from  the first  to the  second  half of 1989.
Conditions  Preceding  Stabillzation
Conditione  in the  Polish  and  Yugoslav  economies  preceding  the  two
stabilization  programs  are  summarized  in table  1.  In Poland,  the  sharp
increase  in inflation  during  1989  was the  result  of not  only the  increased
fiscal  deficit  (7.9  percent  of GNP, the  bulk of  which  was incurred  in the
first  semester)  but also  the  successive  price  shocks  related  to the
liberalization  of food  prices  (August),  the first  round  of adjustment  of
energy  prices  (October)  and repeated  devaluations  accompanied  by  the
introduction  of formal  wage indexation.
In Yugoslavia,  various  factors  contributed  to the  open inflation  of 2,700
percent  in 1989. First,  a large  real  devaluation  in  mid-1988  in the  context
of formal  wage indexation  caused  wages  and  prices  to escalate. Second,
although  the  government  abandoned  its  target  for  the real  exchange  rate  in
mid-1989,  an explosion  in real  wages in the  second  semester  sustained  the
inflationary  pressure. Finally,  the  hidden  losses  in the  system,  which  had
not been  corrected,  constituted  a permanent  source  of monetary  expansion  and
inflation. Pressure  on the  money  supply  was further  increased  by the  large
build-up  in foreign  exchange  reserves  over  the  year.  In 1989,  seignorage
revenues  on base  money reached  13  percent  and  12 percent  of GNP in  Poland  and
Yugoslavia,  respectively.
the  possibility  of  weak links  in the  short  run  and  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1990)
for  a  recent  examination  of the  Argentine  and  Brazilian  cases.Poland  and Yugoslavia
Inflation  (1980-1990)
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The fiscal  deterioration  in  Poland  during  1989  was partly  attributable  to
the  fall in real  tax  revenues,  which in turn  resulted  in  part from  lags  in the
collection  of taxes--the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  (see  Olivera  1967  and  Tanzi
1977). As shown  in table  2, the  revenue  loss  amounted  to 7  percent  of GNP.
In  Yugoslavia,  on the  other  hand,  the  erosion  of fiscal  revenues  in the
1980s  tended  to be offset  by adjustments  in the  tax  rates  and  contributions,
as  well as by the  partial  indexation  of some  taxes.  In the  years  when these
measures  proved  insufficient  to stabilize  real  tax revenues,  the  government
adjusted  expenditures  so as to prevent  a deficit. These  factors  make
estimation  of the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  more difficult  in the  case  of
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia  enjoyed  a more  comfortable  external  position  before  1990  than
did  Poland. The  large  current  account  surplus  of 1989--US$2.4  billion--and
the  successful  debt  rescheduling  of 1988  allowed  foreign  reserves  to rise  to
US$6.1  billion  at the  end  of 1989. Poland,  in contrast,  ran  a current  account
deficit  of US$1.8  billion  in 1989  and  ended  the  year  with  much lower  reserves-
-US$2.5  billion  (much  of  which  was not  useable  as pledged  against
obligations). In addition,  in  Yugoslavia  the  excess  demand  for  foreign
exchange  at the  official  rate  was  mild,  as suggested  by a  barely  positive
black  market  premium  (figure  2).  In Poland,  the  black  market  premium  was
still  very large  in 1989,  despite  the  real  devaluations  after 1987. The size
of the  premium  there  reflected  the  magnitude  of the  exchange  rate  misalignment
and  possibly  some  residual  money  overhang.
It is important  to bear such  differences  in  mind  when examining  the
rationale  £or  some of the  preparatory  measures  taken  in 1989,  especially  in
view of the  goal in  the two  programs  of substantially  reducing  the  exchange11
Table  1
Initial  Conditions  in Poland  and  YugoslAvia
Poland  Yugoslavia
BACKGROUNDs
Inflation  640% in 1l89.  2,700%  in 1989.
Output  1.42  in the 1980s,  0.72  in the 1980s,
Growth  0S in 1989.  0.8S  in 1989.
Rate of  02 in the 1980s,  132  in the 1980s,




GNP  US$  66.2  billion.  US$  67.0  billion.
Current  US$ 1.8  billion  US$  2.4  billion
Account  deficit.  surplus.
Gross  Debt  US$ 40.6  billion.  US$ 17.3  billion.
Reserves  US$  2.5  billion.  US$ 6.1  billion.
Black  Market  4002  average  in 1989  102  avsrage  in 1989
Premium  402  before  the  plan.  302  before  the  plan.
Fiscal/  Fiscal  deficit  Fiscal  surplus  of
Enterprise  of 7.22  of GNP.  0.72  of GNP.
Balance
Enterprise  losses
of 152  of GNP.
Central  Bank  Losses
of 4-52  of GNP.
Large  volume  of
non-performing  loans.
Seignorage  13.52  of GNP.  122  of  GNP.
Ratio  of  47.8Z  33.12
M3 to GNP
Share  of  69..`  69.52
FX deposits
in  M312
Table  2.  Total  Fiscal  Revenues  in Poland  and  Yup_slavia.  1985j  89'
(percent  of GDP)
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Poland  n.a.  49.4  46.9  48.0  40.8
Yugoslavia  33.7  38.2  34.5  33.5  34.7
n.a.  Not available.
a.  Using  a  broad  definition  of the  public  sector  in  both countries.
Source: The  World  Bank.
rate  and  trade  controls. As shown  in figure  3, both  countries  devalued  their
currencies  in real  terms  in  November  and  December  1989. However,  in the  case
of Poland,  the  more adverse  external  conditions  and  the large  exchange  rate
misalignment  dictated  the  need for  much  sharper  real  devaluations.  The same
factors  seem  to explain  why Poland  restricted  the  introduction  of
convertibility  to current  account  transactions,  while in  Yugoslavia
convertibility  was also  extended  to the  capital  account.
Both  countries  adjusted  public  sector  prices  at the  end  of 1989.
However,  in Poland  some  of the  administered  prices  were so low  that even  after
the  very sharp  corrections  made in that  period  (100  percent  increase  in energy
prices  in  October),  the  prices  remained  substantially  below  international
levels  and  had to be further  corrected  at the  start  of the  program.
The two  countries  shared  a severe  problem  of excess  personnel  in  the
enterprise  sector. In the  case  of Poland,  the  extent  of the  problem  is
indicated  by a rate  of unemployment  barely  above  0  percent  throughout  the
1980s. In  Yugoslavia  the  rate  of unemployment  was around  14 percent  in 1989,
a  slight  increase  over  the 13  percent  average  for the  whole decade. Although
this  higher  rate  of unemployment  (concentrated  on new entrants)  in Yugoslavia
seems  to rule  out the  existence  of overstaffing,  a  major cause  of enterprise
losses  was indeed  excess  personnel,  estimated  to have reached  20 percent  of
the labor  force  in 1988 (Nencinger  1989).13
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The  two  countries  also  shared  a  problem  of  flight  from  domestic  assets
end  increasing  velocity.  While  hardly  a  novelty  in  high  inflation  countries,
In  both  countries  the  payment  of  negative  real  intereet  rates  on  domestic
deposits--a  policy  designed  to  provide  subsidized  credits  to  enterprises--
accelerated  the  flight  from  domestic  assets.  In  addition,  the  foreign
exchange  deposits  in  the  financial  systeme  of  both  countries  are  also  likely
to  have  facilitated  the  shift  out  of  domestic  money. Between  1980  and  1989
the  share  of  foreign  exchange  deposits  in  M3  increased  from  20  percent  to  69
percent  in  Poland  and  from  30  percent  to  65  percent  in  Yugoslavia.  In  1989
the  ratio  of  M3  to  GNP  in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  had  declined  to  47  percent  and
33  percent,  respectively.
A Comparison  of  the  Two  Stabilization  Programs
A  sumary comparative  description  of  the  Polish  and  Yugoslav
stabilization  programs  is  provided  in  table  3. On  first  examination,  the  two
programs  look  strikingly  similar.  The  income  policy  components  are  basically
the  same,  including:  (1)  a  temporary  freeze  on  the  exchange  rate  that  both
countries  extended  to  one  year;  (2)  wage  controls  (with  a  complete  freeze  in
Yugoslavia  and  partial  indexation  with  very  low  coefficients  in  Poland);  and
(3)  a  temporary  freeze  on  public  sector  prices. 3 However,  note  that
Yugoslavia  made  all  its  price  corrections  before  the  start  of  its  program,
whereas  Poland  made  large  corrections  to  its  energy  prices  (400  percent)  on
January  1,  1990.
Both  programs  included  a  significant  fiscal  adjustment--7  percent  and  5
percent  of  GNP  in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia,  respectively.  In  the  case  of  Poland,
the  adjustment  was  designed  to close  the  fiscal  deficit,  whereas  in  Yugoslavia
it  was  essentially  designed  to  cover  new,  non-traditional  expenditures.  These
included  the  quasi-fiscal  operations  of  the  central  bank  (servicing  of  foreign
liabilities  and  subsidies  to  favored  sectors),  transfers  to  the  bank
'  In  July  both  countries  made  some  adjustments  to  the  administered
prices.15
Table  3
Sumarized  Description  of  the  Polish  and  Yugoslav  Programs
Poland  Yugoslavia
Incomes  3-month  freeze  on  the  6-month  freeze  on  the
Policy  exchange  rate  (Dollar),  exchange  rate  (Mark),
after  large  adjustment  in  after  some  adjustment  in
December.  Later  extended  December.  Later  extended
to  I  year.  to  1  year.
Partial  and  lagged  wage  6-month  freeze  on
indexation  with  very  nominal  wages.
small  coefficients.
6-month  freeze  on  energy  6-month  freeze  on  energy
prices,  after  large  and  other  public  sector
corrections  in  January.  prices  (20  2  of  CPI),  after
corrections  in  December.
Fiscal  Expected  fiscal  adjustment  Expected  fiscal  adjustment
Policy  of  72  of  GNP.  of  52  of  GNP.
Monetary  Controls  on  Net  Domestic  Controls  on  Net  Domestic
Policy  Assets  of  the  Banking  Assets  of  the  Central  Bank.
System.
Setting  of  discount  rate  Setting  of  discount  rate
at  362  p.m.  in  January,  at  232  p.a;  Full
from  72 in  December.  liberalization
of  other  interest  rates.
Exchange  Partial  Convertibility
and  Trade  (current  account  only).  "Full"  Convertibility
Policies  (some  capital  restrictions
have  remained).
Elimination  of  quotas  and
relaxation  of  licenses.  Reduction  of  quotas  and
relaxation  of  licenses.
Enterprise/  Enforcement  of  bankruptcies
Bank  Reform  through  "dividend  tax".  Enforcement  of  bankruptcies
through  60-day  tolerance
limit  for  arrears.
Evolving  plans  for
enterprise  restructuring  Bank  restructuring  program.
and  privatization.  Evolving  plans  for  enterprise
restructuring  and
privatization.16
restructuring  pro8ram  and  the social  program;  and  coverage  of some  enterprise
arrears,
Both  programs  set  targets  for  the  growth  of net  domestic  assets. In the
case  of  Poland,  the  net  domestic  assets  of the  banking  system  were to grow  at
20 percent  in the first  quarter  and  8 percent  in the  second,  whereas  in
Yugoslavia,  these  assets  were to expand  at slightly  negative  rates  in the  two
first  quarters. Both  programs  allowed  for  the  monetization  of foreign
exchange  inflows.
A first  reaction  to these  figures  might  be that the  monetary  program  in
Yugoslavia  was much tighter. However,  two  critical  factors  necessitate
modifying  this  conclusion.  First,  the  Polish  program  allowed  for  an increase
in domestic  credit  in  anticipation  of the  price  jump  that  would result  from
the  large  correction  in energy  prices  in  January  1990,  a jump  that later
proved  to have  been severely  underestimated.  Second,  the  Yugoslav  program  was
preceded  by a substantial  real  monetary  and  credit  expansion  in  December. As
shown  in  the  next section,  these  and  other  factors  resulted  in a  much tighter
monetary  stance  in Poland.
Both  programs  called  for  a substantial  relaxation  of the  exchange  rate
and  trade  controls,  although  Yugoslavia  maintained  some  quota  restrictions
(amounting  to 12  percent  of total  imports). Yugoslavia  also  introduced  full
currency  convertibility,  while  Poland  restricted  convertibility  to current
account  transactions.
Interruption  of the  explicit  or implicit  subsidization  of inefficient
enterprises  and  free  operation  of the  Darwinian-Schumpeterian  law  of natural
selection  were implicit  in both  programs. Thus,  the  programs  contained
measures  to  preclude  enterprise  recourse  to inter-enterprise  credits  and
arrears, 4 so that inefficient  enterprises  would  be forced  into  bankruptcy.
In the  case of  Yugoslavia,  a limit  of 60 days  of arrears  was established  as
the  trigger  for  bankruptcy  procedures. The  government  was able  to enforce
4  A common  phenomenon  in socialist  countries  that  is known  to  weaken  the
power  of  monetary  policy  considerably.17
this  rule  by means  of a centralized  system  of  payments  among  enterprises  and
banks.  In Poland,  enterprises  were ordered  to  pay  dividends  to the  government
based  on the  book  value  of their  funding  capital.
The two  governments  announced  plans  to restructure  and  privatize
enterprises  and  banks. Yugoslavia  issued  a banking  restructuring  program,  to
be  managed  by a  bank rehabilitation  agency  and  supported  by budgetary
resources. Although  the  agency  was created  in  mid-1990,  enterprise
restructuring  moved slowly,  pending  the establishment  of regional  specialized
institutions.  In addition,  the strategy  for  linking  restructuring  and
privatization  was still  being  debated during  the  course  of 1990,  partly  as a
result  of different  positions  among  the  various  republics.
In Poland,  the  government  made a commitment  to a large-scale
privatization  plan at the start  of the  program,  and  the  legal  framework  for
the  plan  was spelled  out in  a privatization  law  passed  in July 1990. However,
the  legislation  was "enabling"  rather  than "programmatic."  Thus,  no
significant  cases  of bankruptcy  (40  to 50  minor  cases  of bankruptcies
occurred),  restructuring  or privatization  were observed  in the  first  nine
months  following  the  initiation  of the  program. The recognition  that  further
delays  in the  privatization  process  could  ultimately  jeopardize  the  success  of
the  program,  led  to the  introduction  of a  much  more ambitious  plan in  December
1990. The objective  of the  plan  is to privatize  50 percent  of industry  in
three  years.  To this  end, the  plan  relies  on a free  distribution  of  vouchers
to the  public  and  the  creation  of financial  intermediaries  to control  the
enterprises  (see  Frydman  and  Rapaczynski  1990). Before  moving  on to an
examination  of the  initial  results,  some  comments  about  the  implementation  of
the  heterodox  programs  in the  two  socialist  countries  are in order. Incomes
support  to stabilization  is commonly  justified  on the  grounds  that  it reduces
the  unnecessary  losses  in output  that  are  usually  associated  with purely
orthodox  programs. The  possible  reasons  for  these  losses  have  been
investigated  extensively,  including  imperfect  information  (Lucas  1973),  long-
term  or staggered  wage contracts  (Fischer  1977  and  Taylor  1979),  backward  wage18
indexation,  coordination  problems  (Dornbusch  and  Simonsen  1988)  or
monopolistic  price  setting  (e.g.,  Rotemberg  1987  and  Blanchard  and  Fischer
1989).
Although  the  microfoundations  of socialist  and  market  economies  are
clearly  different,  the  case  for  including  incomes  policy  in the  stabilization
programs  of the former  may  be even  stronger. In addition  to the  importance  of
this  policy  in  breaking  the  inflationary  inertia  in the  Yugoslav  and  Polish
economies  (both  countries  formalized  backward  indexation  rules  in the late
1980s),  it  has a role  to play given  the  absence  of  markets  for  both labor  and
capital,  and  it can  counterbalance  the  influence  of the  workers'  councils  in
wage determination. Under  these  conditions,  the  link  between  aggregate  demand
policies  and  the  short-run  behavior  of  wages  and  prices  is likely  to  be weaker
than in  market  economies, 5 making  stronger  the  case for  nominal  anchors.
Examination  of  the Initial  Results
Analysis  of the  initial  results  of the  two  programs  reveals  two  well-
defined  periods. During  the  first  semester  both  programs  achieved  a
substantial  reduction  in  the  rate  of inflation,  as shown  in figure  5.  In the
case of  Yugoslavia,  the  monthly  inflation  rates  were reduced  to zero  at the
end  of the  semester,  while in Poland  they  were around  3-5  percent. 6 The
performance  of both  programs  was  more  mixed  after  June.  In the  case  of
Poland,  monthly  inflation  remained  at around  5 percent,  proving  more
persistent  than  anticipated. In  Yugoslavia,  there  was a revival  of
inflationary  pressures,  as indicated  by monthly  inflation  rates  ranging
between  3 and 8  percent  in the  second  semester. Therefore  it is  useful  to
5  This  point  is acknowledged  by Kornai  (1990),  who also stresses  the
importance  of  wage controls  in the initial  phase  of reform  programs. See also
Rocha (1991)  for  evidence  on the  absence  of the  Okun relationship  in
Yugoslavia.
6  The  newly  computed  calendar  irdices  for  both countries  show  that
inflation  actually  declined  faster  than  indicated  by the regular  indices. The
calendar  indices  are  provided  in table  4 and  in  the  two appendices.19
ezamine  first  the  results  for  the  first  semester  and then  to identify  the  main
problems  that  emerged  during  the  second  semester.
A sharp  contraction  in  economic  activity  followed  the  implementation  of
the  two  programs  in both  countries,  as shown  by the  deseasonalized  indices  of
industrial  production  in figure  6.  The decline  in industrial  production
during  1990  was  much more  pronounced  in Poland  (-20  percent,  with a decline  in
socialized  sector  production  of about  28 percent  and  an increase  in private
sector  production  of about  24  percent)  than  in  Yugoslavia  (-10  percent).
Although  the  post-stabilization  recession  was severe  in  both countries,  it
should  also  be noted  that  the  decline  in  economic  activity  cannot  be blamed
entirely  on the stabilization,  since  it started  in the  second  semester  of
1989,  after  a "peak"  of activity  in the  first  half of that  year.'
The  more severe  recession  in Poland  was also reflected  in  the  relative
behavior  of imports  and the  trade  balance  in the two  countries,  although  in
this  case a  number  of other  factors  were also  at  work,  most  notably  the
sharper  pre-plan  real devaluation  in Poland  (figure  2).  The immediate  import
contraction  was more severe  in the  Polish  case,  as shown  in figure  7.  In
addition,  it  was not followed  by a recovery,  unlike  the  case of  Yugoslavia.
Whereas  the  Polish  trade  balance  shifted  into  a surplus,  in Yugoslavia  the
trade  deficit  increased.8  The  first  reason  for  this difference  in  output
performance  was the  much stronger  direct  supply  shock  arising  from  the
increase  in input  prices  in Poland. A second  likely  reason  is the  tighter
monetary  stance  in the  Polish  program  in the  first  semester,  even  though  a
first  inspection  of the  two  monetary  programs  suggests  otherwise. Figure  8
illustrates  the  differences  in the  quarterly  evolution  of the  real  stock  of
money (Mi  and  M3) in the two  countries. Between  December  1989  and  June 1990,
7  It appears  that  private  sector  activity  is  more reflected  in the
Polish  figure  than in the  Yugoslav  figure. If this  is true,  the  difference  in
output  performance  may  be larger  than indicated.
8  The  large  current  account  surplus  in  Yugoslavia  is  generated  from
workers'  remittances  and tourism.20
real  Ml grew  by 50 percent  in  Yugoslavia  and 15  percent  in  Poland,  as  measured
by calendar  price  indices. In the  case of  M3, the  difference  is  also large.
There  was a decline  of only  5 percent  in  Yugoslavia  versus  40 percent  in
Poland.'
In the  second  semester  the situation  is somewhat  different. The  process
of remonetization  continues  in  Poland  and  is reversed  in  Yugoslavia. As
discussed  in  more detail  below,  that  reflects  essentially  excessive  credit
expansion  in  Yugoslavia  in the  second  semester,  resulting  in  a revival  of
inflation  and  a loss  of foreign  reserves.
The comparative  evaluation  of the  two  monetary  programs  in  the first
semester  centers  on four  major  points. First,  in  Yugoslavia,  all  exchange
rate  and  price  corrections  were carried  out  before  the  plan  and  were smaller
in  magnitude  than  those  in Poland. Therefore,  the  subsequent  impact  on  prices
was also  smaller. In Poland,  the  various  prior  price  and  exchange  rate
adjustments  combined  with the  large  increase  in energy  prices  in January  1990
(400  percent)  resulted  in a price  increase  in  January  whose  magnitude  (100
percent  from  the  beginning  to the  end  of the  month)  was  not anticipated  by the
monetary  programo
Second,  as mentioned  above,  the  Yugoslav  monetary  program  was preceded  by
a large  real increase  in the  stock  of base  money in  December  1989  (25
percent),  resulting  from  increased  domestic  credits  and some  increased  foreign
exchange  inflows  in the  last  two  weeks  of the  year.  This  growth  in the  pre-
plan stock  of  money  was  not observed  in Poland.
Third,  the  net domestic  assets  of the  central  bank  of Yugoslavia  during
the first  semester  behaved  according  to the  program--basically  flat  in  nominal
terms.  in the  case  of  Poland,  the  net domestic  assets  of the  banking  system
did not  rise to the targeted  level,  essentially  because  of the  better  than
expected  budgetary  performance. There  was no attempt  to divert  credit  within
the ceilings  to the  enterprises.
9  The real decrease  in the  Yugoslav  M3 is  a  somewhat  stronger  12  percent
when the foreign  exchange  assets  held abroad  by Yugoslav  enterprises  are
included. However,  it is  still  a  much smaller  decrease  than  in Poland.21
Fourth,  large  inflows  of  foreign  exchange  resulted  in  a  substantial
increase  in  the  net  foreign  assets  in  both  countries.  In  the  case  of  Poland,
the  inflows  were  generated  in  the  trade  account,  while  in  the  case  of
Yugoslavia  they  were  generated  by  Increased  workers'  remittances  and  the
repatriation  of  foreign  exchange  assets  held  abroad  by  enterprises.  Although
the  increase  in  net  foreign  assets  was  even  greater  in  the  case  of  Poland,  the
other  factors,  most  notably  the  price  jump  in  January,  produced  a  much  more
severe  monetary  crunch.
The  conclusion  that  monetary  policy  was  tighter  in  Poland  based  on  a
comparison  of  real  money  stocks  may  not  be  valid,  however,  since  it  implicitly
assumes  that  the  real  demand  for  domestic  money  was  equally  strong  in  the  two
countries.  The  large  price  shocks  at  the  start  of  the  program  in  Poland  may
initially  have  created  adverse  expectations  that  lowered  the  demand  for  money.
In  any  case,  the  above  comparison  reveals  interesting  differences  in  the
design  of  monetary  policy  in  the  two  programs.  In  particular,  it  shows  the
desirability  of  carrying  out  all  price  corrections  before  establishing  the
monetary  targets.  Another  interesting  point  is  that  in  neither  country  did
households  convert  their  stocks  of  foreign  exchange  deposits  into  domestic
currency  deposits,  despite  the  frozen  exchange  rate  and  higher  interest  rate
on  domestic  deposits.  In  the  Israeli  stabilization  program  such  a  conversion
constituted  an  important  source  of  non-inflationary  monetary  expansion
(Liviatan  1988).  The  absence  of  conversion  in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  could
signal  an initial  lack  of credibility  of the  program,  particularly  of the
exchange  rate  policy."'
10  In  both  countries,  the  decline  in  the  share  of  foreign  exchange
deposits  in  broad  money  was  almost  entirely  due  to  the  real  increase  in  the
stock  of  domestic  money.22
Table  4
Results  of the  Polish  and  Yugoslav  Programs  During  1990
Poland  Yugoslavia
Inflation  1989: 640S  1989:  2,700Z
(Dec.-Dec.)  1990: 2502  1990:  1202
Output  Industrys  -20.02  Industry:  -10.5Z
Grovth  GDP:  -12.52  GDP:  -7.52
Rate  of  1989:  0  1989:  14.2Z
Unemployment  1990  (December):  6.12  1990 (mid-year): 14.92
Trade  1989:  US$0.2  billion  surplus  1989:  US$ 1.5  billion  deficit.
Balance  1990:  US$2.2  billion  surplus  1990:  US$  4.7  billion  deficit.
Current  1989:  US$1.8  billion  deficit  1989:  US$ 2.0  billion  surplus.
Balance  1990:  US$0.7  billion  surplus  1990:  US$  2.7  billion  deficit.
Reserve  Dec. 1989:  US$ 2.5 billion  Dec. 1989:  US$ 6.1 billion
Position  June 1990:  US$ 3.9 billion  June 1990:  US$ 8.6  billion
Dec. 1990:  US$  6.8  billion  Dec. 1990:  US$ 6.7  billion
Black  Market  Reduced  to zero.  Reduced  to zero in  December.
Premium  Increased to 20Z  during the
year.
Monetary  Cumulative  Real Changes:  Cumulative  Real  Changes:
Aggregates  Ml  M3  Ml  M3
Dec.-June:  -152  -422  Dec.-June:  492  -52
Dec.-Dec.:  582  -422  Dec.-Dec.:  402  -202
Share  of  Dec. 1989:  692  Dec. 1989:  652
PX deposits  June 1990:  42X  June 1990:  512
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It is natural  to look  at  nominal  interest  rates  as an indicator  of
liquidity  conditions  that result  from  an immediate  contraction  in the supply
of  money  and  the  reshuffling  of the  portfolios  of asset  holders. However,  in
both countries  the  exogenously  determined  discount  rates  influenced  the
determination  of interest  rates  considerably,  making  them  poor ind4.cators  of
liquidity  conditions. In  Yugoslavia,  interest  rates  on short-term  deposits
were relatively  stable  during  the  year (10-15  percent  per  year),  in spite  of
the  large  fluctuations  in  monetary  conditions  in  this  period. In Poland,
short-term  deposit  rates  moved  from  15  percent  per  month  in  January  and
February  to 5-6  percent  per  month  in  the following  months,  becoming  slightly
positive  in real  terms. Lending  rates  were much  higher  in  both countries,  but
that situation  to a large  extent  reflects  the  non-performing  loans  in the
banks'  portfolios,  and  not  just  liquidity  factors. Finally,  the  real
devaluation  in Poland  may also  account  for  the  stronger  initial  contraction  of
activity  relative  to  Yugoslavia." Indeed,  the  first  indications  are  that
the  unambiguously  adverse  supply-side  effects  of a real  devaluation  were not
offset  by expansionary  effects  on the  demand  side.  In the  traded  goods
sector,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  increase  in foreign  demand  offset  the
contractionary  supply-side  effects. In the  case  of non-traded  goods,  it is
most likely  that the  demand-side  effects  were also  contractionary.  The  wealth
effect  was largely  negative,  as indicated  by the  40  percent  real  decrease  in
M3,  while some  redistribution  of real income  from  wages to  profits  is also
likely  to  have depressed  demand." 2
A complete  comparative  evaluation  of the  initial  results  of the
stabilization  programs  requires  a  more detailed  analysis  of the  impact  of
policies  on real incomes  in the  two  economies. In both  countries,  there  was a
"  In the case  of  Yugoslavia,  the  real  exchange  rate in the  first
quarter  of 1990  had already  appreciated  relative  to the level  in  December.
12  The  evaluation  of the  net  impact  of a real  devaluation  on output  is
complicated  by the  notorious  multiplicity  of channels  (see  Lizondo  and  Montiel
1989  for  a recent  survey). When the  devaluation  is carried  out in the  context
of a stabilization  program,  it is further  complicated  by the  simultaneous
implementation  of other  policies.27
substitution  of  explicit  taxes  for  the  inflation  tax. However,  the  increase
in  explicit  taxation  was  smaller  than  the  volume  of  inflationary  taxation  in
1989,  especially  in  Yugoslavia.  When  this  factor  is  looked  at  in  isolation,
there  seems  to  have  been  an  increase  in  the  net  real  income  of  households  and
enterprises.  However,  real  wages  also  fell  substantially  in  the  two  countries
(figure  4), In  part  the  reason  was  the  removal  of  the  credit  subsidies  for
enterprises.  Thus  the  decline  in  real  wages  indirectly  reflects  the
elimination  of inflationary  financing  of  enterprise  losses.
It  is  difficult  to  assess  the  net  impact  of  these  factors  on  real
incomes.  In  addition,  the  situation  is  likely  to  be  highly  differentiated
across  households  and  enterprises.  While  the  real  wage  adjustment  may  have
allowed  several  enterprises  to  operate  without  a loss  (without  meaning  that
they  became  efficient),  in  other  cases  there  would  still  have  been  a  loss  even
with  a  further  substantial  reduction  in  the  real  wage. In  fact,  during  the
first  semester  the  wage  ceilings  became  non-binding  for  several  enterprises  in
both  countries.  The  tightening  of  credit  during  the  first  semester  had  a
strong  impact  on  the  enterprise  sector.  In  Yugoslavia,  7,000  enterprises  had
difficulty  making  payments  to  banks  and  other  enterprises,  3,000  had
accumulated  arrears  for  30  days  and  350  were  declared  bankrupt.  A large
number  of  enterprises  was  reported  to  have  interrupted  their  wage  payments
(especially  in  May)  to  postpone  bankruptcy.  At  the  end  of  the  first  semester
the  situation  was,  however,  highly  differentiated,  with  a  group  of  enterprises
increasing  wages  above  the  ceilings  and  another  group  unable  to  make  wage
payments  within  the  ceilings.
Pressure  to  relax  the  monetary  policy  mounted  in  the  first  semester  and
led  to  a  relaxation  after  June. The  shift  to  a  relaxed  monetary  stance  was
achieved  mostly  through  the  implementation  of  measures  to  increase  the
multiplier.  These  measures  produced  a  rapid  increase  in  the  stock  of  bank
credits  after  June  (figure  9). The  easing  of  monetary  policy  led  to  further
increases  in  wages  and  contributed  to  a  revival  of  inflation  in  the  second
semester.  It  also  aborted  the  expected  shake-out  of  the  industrial  sector  by28
keeping  loss-making  enterprises  afloat  and  allowing  them  to resume  wage
payments.
Concern  over  the  revival  of inflation  led  the  central  bank to return  to a
tight  monetary  stance  in  early  October. However,  pressed  by enterprises  to
continue  lending,  commercial  banks  reduced  reserves  below  the  required  levels,
thereby  weakening  the  central  bank's  control  over  monetary  policy." Further
evidence  of the  difficulties  faced  by the  central  bank to conduct  monetary
policy  was the  unusual  episode  of December  1990,  whereby  one regional  branch
of the central  bank  expanded  credits  by US$1.8  billion  equivalent  of Dinars  to
finance  the  payment  of  wages  and  pensions  (The  Economist,  January  12,  1991)  in
the region,  without  notification  to the  board  of governors. The  monetary
impact  of the  domestic  credit  expansion  was largely  offset  by a substantial
loss  of foreign  reserves  during  the  same  period. However,  these  events  raised
obvious  doubts  about  the  sustainability  of the  stabilization  program.
In  Poland,  despite  the  sharp  contraction  in industrial  output,  no
bankruptcies  occurred. Nor  did  the  expected  shake-out  of the  industrial
sector,  with inefficient  enterprises  sinking  under  the  pressure  of the
elimination  of subsidies,  take  place."'  The  Darwinian-Schumpeterian  process
of natural  selection  did  not  operate. As noted,  the  main trigger  mechanism
for  bankruptcy  procedures  is  a failure  to pay  the  dividend  tax.  The
appropriateness  of this  mechanism  as the  main trigger  for  restructuring  and/or
bankruptcy  is,  however,  questionable.  First,  the  tax  was not  burdensome
(around  6 percent  of total  profits). Second,  many enterprises  paid  the
dividend  tax  while  also  failing  to  meet obligations  with other  enterprises  and
banks.  However,  neither  creditor  firms  nor the  banks  initiated  bankruptcy
1"  This  problem  has  arisen  as a result  of the  control  exercised  on the
banks  by the  enterprises.
"  An interesting  simulation  by de la Calle  (1990),  based  on data  on
domestic  resource  costs  computed  by Ronovalov  (1989a),  estimated  that  the
stabilization  program  would  have led  to a  contraction  of about  20  percent  in
industrial  output,  a contraction  led  by the  bankruptcy  of enterprises  in
particularly  inefficient  sectors. His  predictions  on the  sectoral  fall  in
output  display  a  recession  much  more  uneven  than  the  one that  actually  took
place.29
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procedures,  Implying  some  sort  of  collusive  behavior  among  firms  and  banks.
The  inefficiencies  arising  from  these  inter-linkages  among  enterprises  is  one
of  the  main  issues  that  has  to  be  tackled  in  the  second  stage  of  the  program.
Both  fiscal  and  credit  policies  were  relaxed  after  July,  in  an  attempt  to
stimulate  the  economy. The relaxation  of credit  policies  opened  the  way to a
significant  increase  in  real  wages  and  contributed  to  a  certain  revival  of
inflation. In an attempt  to reduce  these  inflationary  pressures,  credit
policy  was  tightened  in  the  fourth  quarter,  with  the  imposition  of  strict
ceilings  on  each  commercial  bank  on  credit  to  the  socialized  sector.  However,
the  overall  credit  expansion  largely  exceeded  the  targets,  mainly  bacause  of  a
sharp  expansion  of  credit  to  the  non-socialized  sector,  which  was  exempted
from  the  ceilings.  Despite  the  tightening  of  credit  to  the  socialized  sector,
wage  pressures  in this  sector  remained  unabated,  revealing  the  difficulties  in
containing  wages  under  the  present  ownership  structure.
Developments  in 1990  raise  a  more general  issuet under  the  present
structure  of  these  economies,  macroeconomic  policies  alone  cannot  generate  an
efficient  natural  selection.  Inter-enterprise  credits  link  "good"  and  "bad"
enterprises,  opening  the  way  for  chain  of  bankruptcies  involving  "good"
enterprises.  Also,  if  the  banking  system  is  inefficient  and,  in  the  case  of
Yugoslavia,  controlled  by  enterprises,  resources  are  not  necessarily
channelled  to  the  more  efficient  uses. Under  these  conditions,  the  attempt  to
enforce  hard  budget  constraints  may  result  in  a  generalized  credit  crunch--as
seems  to  have  happened  in  the  first  semester  of  1990  in  Poland--with  unclear
effects  on  efficiency.
Assessmaent  of  the  Main  Issues
The  issues  that  policy-makers  in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  will  have  to  address
include  some  that  belong  to  the  stabilization  component  per  se  and  others  that
are  of  a  structural  nature.  In  the  first  group,  the  most  important  issues  are
the  unfreezing  of  the  exchange  rate,  the  introduction  of  a  new  wage  policy  and
the  adequacy  of  the  fiscal  support  for  the  restructuring  component  of  the  two31
programs.  This  group  also  includes  the  need  to  reduce  the  servicing  of
external  debt  in order  to avoid  a  drain  of scarce  resources  that  ideally
should  be  channelled  toward  the  restructuring  of  the  economy.  The  second
group  comprises  the  restructuring  and  privatization  of  enterpriees  and  banks
and  the  developments  of  the  labor  and  financial  markets.
Recognition  that  the  real  exchange  rate  in  Yugoslavia  had  severely
appreciated  led  to  a  30  percent  corrective  devaluation  in  January  1,  1991. In
the  case  of  Poland,  the  real  appreciation  is  probably  not  so  severe  as  in  the
case  of  Yugoslavia,  given  the  large  real  devaluation  at  the  start  of  the
program.  Obviously,  if  inflation  does  not  quickly  subside,  the  extent  of  the
real  appreciation  is  likely  to  become  unsustainable  during  1991.
Although  the  exchange  rate  correction  in  Yugoslavia  seemed  unavoidable,
given  the  rapid  lose  of foreign  reserves  at the  end  of 1990,  it  did  result  in
increasing  rates  of  inflation  at  the  start  of  1991  (5  and  10  percent  in
January  and  February,  respectively).  This  increase  in  inflation  happened
despite  the  introduction  of  a  new  package  of  measures  designed  to  contain  the
impact  of the  devaluation,  which included  a freeze  on nominal  wages paid  by
loss-making  enterprises,  and  new  regulation  designed  to prevent  other  episodes
of monetary  decontrol. Success  at preventing  the  reemergence  of an exchange
rate-wages-prices  spiral  will  obviously  depend  on  more effective
implementation  of  wage  and  monetary  policies,  requiring  a  high  degree  of
consensus  among  the  various  republics.
Despite  the  present  uncertainty  regarding  the  continuing  implementation
of  these  measures,  they  do  reflect  the  recognition  that  some  form  of  wage
policy  is  needed,  especially  while  labor  markets  are  not  sufficiently
developed  and  the  ownership  rights  problem  is  not  adequately  solved.  The
design  of  a  wage  policy  for  the  transition  is  indeed  a  difficult  task. On  the
one  hand  it  has  to  counteract  the  excessive  influence  of  the  workers'
councils.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  minimize  the  inefficiencies  arising
from  strict  and  generalized  wage  controls,  which  can  hinder  the  recovery  of
economic  activity.32
This  point  io  also  relevant  in  the  case  of Poland,  where  a  wage policy
has  been  maintatned  for  the  first  half  of  19910 However,  several  changes  were
introduced. First,  the  control  of  wages  shifted  from  the  wage bill  to the
wage  per  worker,  in  order  to  eliminate  constraints  on  expanding  firms.
Second,  wage  increases  became  conditional  on  profitability  performance.
Finally,  private  firms  were  excluded  from  wage  ceilings  and  corporatized  firms
were  partially  exempted  from  tax  penalties  on  wage  increases  above  the
ceilings. However,  monthly  indexation  of  wages  still  remains,  with  adverse
effects  on inflationary  inertia.
Fiscal  support  for  restructuring  is another  critical  issue  in the  two
countries. While the  fiscal  adjustment  has  proven  sufficient  to  close  the
deficit  in  Poland  and  to absorb  the  central  bank's  deficit  in  Yugoslavia,  it
does  not  seem  to be consistent  with the  intention  of implementing  a serious
restructuring  program  in  both countries. For  instance,  it has  become  clear
that  the  fiscal  commitments  to the  social  program  in  Yugoslavia  would  have
been  inadequate  had  the  loss-making  enterprises  really  been  forced  into
bankruptcy.  The  initial  fiscal  commitments  to  the  financial  restructuring
also  proved  largely  insufficient  at  the  end  of  the  year.
In the  area  of restructuring,  a  wide range  of issues  needs  to be
coneidered.  At  the  level  of  each  enterprise,  restructuring  entails  laying  off
excess  personnel,  writing  off  debts  in  justified  cases,  making  selective
investments  capable  of improving  the  efficiency  of existing  capital,  changing
manage  ent  and  so one.  It also  entails  closing  enterprises  that  cannot  become
profitable even  with the  above  measures. At the  level  of each  bank,
restructuring  involves  a detailed  evaluation  of its  portfolio,  the  removal  of
bad loans  from  the  portfolios,  a severing  of the  links  between  banks  and
enterprises,  and the introduction  and  enforcement  of prudential  financial
regulation  and iupervision. A crucial  question  related  to the  restructuring
of the  enterprises  and  banks  is  who  will  be in charge  of this  formidable  task
and  under  what system  of incentives.  An approach  to restructuring  that  is
excessively  centralized  and  excludes  privatization  may  not only  prove  too  slow33
to implement,  given  the institutional  deficiencies,  but  may also  produce  an
undesirable  selection  of enterprises  and sectors  for  restructuring.  A more
rapid  move toward  large-scale  privatization  seems  to be required  to  minimize
the  risks  of  wasting  resources  during  the  restructuring  and  to enhance  the
prospects  of a sustained  supply  response. (For  a detailed  discussion  of this
iesue,  see  Hindc.  1990,  Lipton  and  Sachs  1990,  and  Frydman  and  Rapaczynski
1990.)
While forcing  inefficient  enterprises  into  bankruptcy  is  an important
step  in the right  direction,  in the  absence  of  well-functioning  labor  and
capital  markets  that  permit  an efficient  reallocation  of resources  across
firms  and  sectors,  a large  pool of  unemployed  could  be generated  for  a
protracced  period. The impossibility  of developing  a  true  labor  market
without  developing  in  parallel  a  market  for  capital  again  raises  the  issue  of
privatization  (see  Hinds  1990). In addition,  the  development  of a labor
market  will require  that  policy-makers  address  the  issues  of housing  ownership
and  financing,  two  notorious  obstacles  to labor  mobility  in socialist
countries.
While  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  acknowledge  the importance  of these  issues,
they  have  been addresssing  them  too slowly. Failure  to  provide  prompt
solutions  to these  problems  could  lead  to a protracted  stagnation  of output
and  a return  to  high inflation. In this  regard,  the  model  of sequencing
traditionally  applied  to  Latin  American  countries,  in  which  structural  issues
are  relegated  to later  stages  of the  adjustment  programs,  does  not seem  to be
applicable  to reforming  socialist  countries,  in  which stabilization  and
structural  reforms  are  much more  closely  intertwined.34
APPENDIX  A
STABILIZATION IN  POLAND
BaSkground
The Polish  stabilization  program  of January  1990  is  undoubtedly  one  of
the  most radical  attempts  to transform  quickly  into  a  market  economy. In
addition  to the  severity  of Poland's  macroeconomic  situation,  the  government
chose  to pursue  a "cold  turkey"  approach  to stabilization  (whence  the label
"Big  Bang"),  because  of the  disillusionment  with the  gradualist  reform
strategy  followed  in the 1980s. That  strategy,  which  relied  on increased
enterprise  decentralization  but  within  a context  of continuing  state
interference  in the  allocation  of inputs,  licensing  of imports  and  exports,
and  determination  of prices,  had  not  provided  visible  improvements  in
efficiency. In fact,  the  partial  decentralization  of enterprise  decision-
making--reminiscent  of the  idea  of "market  socialism"--in  a context  of absent
factor  markets  and  persistent  soft  budget  constraints  actually  contributed  to
a  widening  of the  macroeconomic  imbalances  in the 1980s. Several  rescheduling
agreements  of  the  external  debt  partly  masked  the  severity  of  the  external
position  and allowed  Poland  to grow  at relatively  high  rates  in the  period
1983-88  and to  maintain  relatively  high  rates  of investment  growth  (figure  1-
1).
On the  other  hand,  the  rate  of inflation  averaged  above  50 percent  in the
1980s,  a  condition  that  prima facie  put  Poland  in  with the  "chronic  inflation"
countries  (figure  1-1).' However,  the  persistent  inflation  during  the 1980s
reduced  significantly  the  stock  monetary  overhang,  a  point  on  which  Poland's
experience  differed  from  the  typical  experience  of the  centrally  planned
economies  with rigid  price  controls,  such  as Bulgaria  and  the  Soviet  Union.
Accordingly,  the  underlying  inflationary  pressures  in the  1980s  arose,
overall,  more from flow  than from  stock  factors  (Lipton  and  Sachs  1990). In
this  regard,  cost-push  factors,  such  as the  cost of labor  and  the  prices  of
imports,  played  a fundamental  role in  the  context  of a  price-setting  system
dominated  by "cost-plus"  behavior. However,  the  widespread  price  controls
that  prevailed  until  the  end  of 1989  and  that  affected  about  50 percent  of
total  retail  sales  complicate  the  analysis  of inflation. Although  repressed
inflation  does  not  seem  to have  been  a "chronic"  phenomenon  in Poland  in the
1980s,  the  mixed  system  of controlled  and  free  prices  tended  to  adjust  slowly
to excess  demand  and  to generate  large  gaps  between  the  controlled  and  free
prices,  with adverse  effects  on the  budgtaet.  Thus,  an inflation  that  behaved
erratically,  "stop-and-go"  phenomena  and  the  inertia  elements  in  the catch-up
between  controlled  and free  prices  were not  only  important  features  of Polish
inflation  in the 1980s  but  were also  particularly  important  in the
acceleration  of inflation  in 1989,16  Large  disequilibria  did  indeed  precede
the  "corrective"  jumps  in the  price  level,  mainly  in 1982  and 1988-89,  with
"'  The  Polish  rate  of inflation  in the 1980s  was extremely  high  by
European  standards,  even  excluding  1989. The average  for  the  period  1981-88
was ;3  percent,  compared  with 5 percent  for  industrial  countries,  38 percent
for  developing  countries,  8 percent  for  Hungary  and 1.3  percent  for  other
Eastern  European  countries,  excluding  Yugoslavia.
16  A macroeconomic  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of inflation  in a  mixed
system  of free  and  controlled  prices  can  be found  in  Commander  and  Coricelli
(1990a).35
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relatively  stable  rates  of inflation  of 20  percent  per anum  inside  the  peake,
a rate  that  was high  by European  standards.
Preliminary  econometric  results  confirm  this  pattern  (table  1-1). The
regression,  which  tries  to separate  cost-push  factors  from  monetary
disequilibria--as  measured  by the  change  in the  ratio  of  household  money  to
retail  sales--indicates  that,  overall,  cost-push  factors  were the  main
determinants  of price  inflation  in  the  period  1983-89.
Table  1-1.  Poland:  Inflation  in  the 1980s
Quarterly regression 1983-89)'
DLCPI - 0.72*DLCPI(-1)  + 0.42*DLWAGES  + O.*DLOER + 0.23*DLM3/RS  - 0.63*ECM
(7.1)  (7v1)  (7.1)  (2.8)  (-3.5)
R2 - 0.97; DW - 1.33;  e - 0.0042
Note:  DLCPI - the  rate  of inflation;  DLWAGES  the  rate  of change  in
wages;  DLOER - the  rate  of change  in the  official  exchange  rate;
DLM3/RS  - the  change  in the  ratio  of household  broad  money  to
retail  sales;  and  ECM - the  error  correction  term,  defined  as tne
difference  between  prices  and  costs  (wages  plus the  exchange
rate). The t-statistics  in  parentheses.
a.  The  equation  in the  main text  is  part of a system  estimation,  in
which  prices  and  wages are  simultaneously  estimated.
Sources Commander  and  Coricelli  (199Ob).
However,  if the  coefficients  in the  above  equation  are  used,  in the
period  of accelerating  inflation  in 1988  up to the  third  quarter  of 1989,
monetary  imbalances  exerted  important  pressure  on inflation. Indeed,  20
percent  of the  increase  in prices  in that  period  is  explained  by the  monetary
disequilibrium,  while  cost-push  factors  accounted  for  the  remaining  80
percent,  with 65  percent  attributable  to  wages  and 15  percent  to the exchange
rate.
The  fact that  inflation  remained  relatively  high  following  the  jump  in
the  price  level  in 1982  suggests  the  presence  of inertia  elements  in the
inflation. These  can  be traced  mainly  to a de facto  full  indexation  of  wages
to prices  that  operated  throughout  the  period  1983-89  and,  after  19859  to an
exc  hangs  rate  policy  aimed  at stimulating  exports  through  continued
"competitive"  devaluations.
Discrete  shocks  to the  price  level,  usually  through  a change  in
administered  prices,  tended  to be translated  into  a persistent  sigher  level  of
inflation.  Thus,  the  system,  with its  generally  accommodating  monetary  policy,
lacked  a nominal  "anchor." In the  mixed  system  of free  and  controlled  prices,
price  controls  proved  to be a pure  substitute  for  the  missing  anchor. Indeed,
price  controls  had  an adverse  effect  on the  fiscal  budget--as  they implied
subsidies--and  with passive  money  this  channel  fueled  inflation.7
17  17  Commander  and  Coricelli  (1990a)  show  several  cases  in  which
this  mixed  system  of free  and  controlled  prices,  with "passive"  money,  can
generate  explosive  rates  of inflation.37
The  price  controls  gave  rise  to  varioue  types  of  subsidies  to  cover  the
difference  between  the  price  and  production  costal  the  subsidies  vere
channelled  to  both  households  and  enterprises.  Moreover,  when  the  input
subsidies  were  reduced  through  increases  in  the  administered  prices,
especially  those  of  energy--as,  for  instancep  in  1988--sizable  subsidies  on
interest  rates  cushioned  the  enterpriese  from  these  adverse  supply  shocks.
Only in 1990  did this  compensation  disappear,  with the simultaneous
elimination  of  both  types  of  subsidies.
In  general,  the  system  allowed  the  enterprise  sector  to  register  net
profits  in  the  aggregate  without,  as  before  19899  large  deficits  for  the
consolidated  government  sector  (including  transfers  for  the  service  of  the
foreign  debt).  Therefore,  a  "pure"  fiseal  explanation  of  underlying  inflation
does  not  seem  to  be  relevant  to  the  Polish  experience  in  the  1980s.
Neverthelese,  as  noted,  sizable  hidden  subsidiee,  mainly  in  the  form  of
implicit  subsidies  for  interest  rates,  were  channelled  to the  enterprises,
accounting  for  a  significant  portion  of  the  seigniorage  from  money  creation.
According  to  some  estimates,  the  interest  rate  subsidies  amounted  to  an
average  of  6  percent  of  GDP  in  the  period  1984-88."  The  subsidies  on
interest  rates  thus  allowed  firms  to  operate  with  positive  profits,
compensating  them  for  the  high  costs  of  the  inefficiency  in  production,  such
as  overstaffing  and  the  generally  high  intensity  of  inputs  in  production,
common  symptoms  of  soft  budget  constraints.
The  largely  negative  real  interest  rates  on  lending  were  accompanied  by
even  more  negative  real  rates  on  deposits.  As  a  result,  households
increasingly  shifted  out  of  zloty-denominated  assets  and  into  foreign  currency
deposits  (table  1-2). The  base  for  the  inflation  tax  was  progressively
reduced  in  the  1980s  as  the  currency  substitution  advanced,  a  pattern  that
increased  velocity  in  terms  of  MI  and  reinforced  the  inflationary  pressures--
open  or  repressed--arising  from  the  need  to  finance  both  the  budget  deficit
and  the  hidden  subeidies  to  the  socialized  sector.
During  1987-889  and  then again  in  19899  the  authorities  attempted  to
impose  more  stringent  financial  discipline  on  the  enterprises  by  tightening
bank  credit.  However,  given  the  predominantly  soft  budget  constraints,  the
attempts  to enforce  financial  discipline  through  credit  ceilings  were  largely
ineffective,  with  enterprises  bypassing  the  ceilings  by extending  credit  to
each  other.  The  ratio  of  inter-firm  credit  to  bank  credit  to  the  socialized
sector  went  from  about  50  percent  at  the  end  of  1987  to  70  percent  at  the  end
of  1988  and  155  percent  at  the  end  of  1989.
Preuaration  for  the  Stabilization  Program  and  Other  Developments  in  1989
Two  clearly  distinct  phases,  separated  by  the  change  in  government,
characterized  1989. In  the  first,  which  corresponds  to  the  first  three
quarters,  there  was a  sharp  deterioration  in the  macroeconomic  situation. In
the  second,  corresponding  to  the  last  quarter  of  1989,  when  the  new  government
was  in  power,  there  was  a  marked  reduction  in  the  fiscal  and  monetary
disequilibria,  paving  the  way  for  the  stabilization  program  of  January  1,
1990.
"  Saldanha  (1989).  The  interest  rate  subsidies  were  measured  by  the
difference  between  the  nominal  rates  for  credit  and  the  rate  of  inflation.
However,  when  the  inflation  tax  on  the  monetary  holdings  (currency  plus  demand
deposits)  of  enterprises  is  netted  out,  the  net  subsidies  in  the  period  1984-
88  fall  to  about  2-3  percent  of  GDP.38
Table  1-2.  PolAnd:  Konotarv  Xadicator.
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
(percent  of  GDP)
H1  --  20.1  19.5  18.5  14.6  10.1
Broad  --  44.3  46.2  51.5  56.5  47.5
money
(percent  of  broad  money)
H1  46.6  44.3  40,3  32.0  20.8  21.9
Currency 20.2  19.6  16.8  12.0  9.9  115
Quasi
Money  53.4  55.7  59.7  68.0  79.2  78.1
Zloty  80.7  75.1  68.8  53.7  35.1  30.7
Foreign  19.3  24.9  31.2  46.3  64.9  69.3
currency
Socialized  32.1  26.9  24.9  26.6  19.4  25.1
ae-tor
Non-soc. 67.9  73.1  75.1  73.4  80.6  74.9
gector
a.  Average  stock,  geometric  mean.
Source:  National  Bank  of  Poland;  International  Financial  Statistics
The  f  t  se  The  wage  push  initiated  in  the  second  half  of  1988
gained  strength  at  the  beginning  of  1989,  the  result  being  sigable  increases
in  real  wages  and  a  real  appreciation.  In  addition,  the  budget  deficit
deteriorated  sharply  during  the  first  half  of  1989  because  of  a  substantial
decline  in  revenues  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  increased  expenditures. 19 The
consolidated  budget  of  the  general  government  moved  from  an  initial  balance  in
1988  to  a  deficit  of  7.2  percent  of  GDP  in  1989. It  should  be  noted  that  80
Dercent  of  the  state's  budget  deficit  (excluding  extra-budgetary  funds)  in
l989  was  accumulated  in  the  first  half  of  the  year. The  deficit  was  financed
mainly  through  central  bank  credits  and  money  creation.
Interestingly,  the  worsening  of  the  "fundamentals"  in  the  first  half  of
1989  did  not  immediately  result  in  hyperinflation.  In  the  first  half  of  1989
the  monthly  rate  of  inflation  averaged  7  percent  and  did  not  accelerate  during
the  period.  The  cumulative  increase  in  prices  was  about  60  percent  with
respect  to  December  1989. This  lack  of  synchronization  between  the
acceleration  of  inflation  and  worsening  fundamentals  is  consistent  with  the
stop-and-go  nature  of  the  system  with  its  widespread  price  controls,  in  which
19  Note  that  wage  push  and  budget  deficits  are  directly  linked  through
the  wages  of  the  public  sector,  which  are  tied  institutionally  to  wages  set  in
the  socialized  sector  (see  Gomulka  1990).39
a  widening  of  monetary  Imbalances  generally  precedes  corrective  price
increases.  That  growing  monetary  imbalances  were  created  in  the  first  half  of
1989  can  be  inferred  from  the  rapidly  depreciating  exchange  rate  in  the
parallel  market,  a  signal  of a loes  in  confidence  in the  domestic  curreney.
The  share  of  foreign  currency  deposits  increased  from  65  percent  at  the  end  of
1988  to  71  percent  at  the  end  of  June  1989.
The  outburst  in  the  rate  of  inflation  occurred  in  August,  when  retail
prices  jumped  to  39.5  percent  from  9.5  percent  in  July. The  liberalization  of
food  prices  in  August  at a time  of significant  excess  demand  caused  a jump in
those  prices.  Wage  earners  tried  to  catch  up  to  the  increased  food  prices  by
demanding  higher  wages,  in effect  indexing  wages  de  facto  to food  prices,
which  were  rising  more  than  the  average  price  level.  This  phenomenon may  have
contributed  to  further  inflationary  pressures  In  the  non-food  sector  as  well.
Formal  institution  of a  wage indexation  rule  in  April  and  the  policy  of
adjusting  the  official  exchange  rate  to  catch  up  with  the  black  market
exchange  rate  further  increased  the  inflationary  inertia.  The  official
exchange  rate,  which  Lad  depreciated  roughly  in  line  with  inflation  in  the
first  seven  months  (about  65  percent),  was  depreciated  by  680  percent  in  the
remaining  months  of  the  year,  when  the  cumulative  increase  in  inflation  was
320  percent.
D  second  ghase The  new  government,  which  took  office  in  September,
tried  promptly  to  halt  the  deterioratic-  in  the  macroeconomic  situation,
istituting  several  measures  to  tighten  credit  policy,  reduce  the  budget
deficit,  curb  the  wage  increases  and  correct  the  prices  of  energy  and  other
highly  subsidized  goods.  The  adjustments  in  the  prices  of  energy  produced  an
initial  acceleration  in  inflation  in  October.  A reduction  of  the  operiodicity
of  wage  adjustments  from  quarterly  to  monthly  and  the  frequent  exchange  rate
devaluations  also  fuelled  inflation. 20 In  December  real  wages  were  27
percent  above  their  level  in  October,  while  the  official  exchange  rate
depreciated  by  260  percent  in  the  period  October-December.
After  October,  however,  the  improvement  in  the  fundamentals  did  exert
downward  pressure  on  inflation,  which  decelerated  sharply  from  54.8  percent  to
17.7  percent  in  December.  At  the  same  time,  the  premium  of  the  parallel
market  over  the  official  exchange  rate  was  substantially  reduced  by  the  end  of
1989,  an  indication  of  a  significant  improvement  in  the  monetary
disequilibria.  Three  main  factors  explain  this  reduction  of  the  premium:  the
devaIuation  of  the  official  exchange  rate;  the  slowdown  in  the  rate  of  growth
of  the  money  supply,  linked  to  the  improvement  in  the  budget  deficitt  and  the
reduction  in  the  monetary  overhang  ae  a  result  of  the  large  cumulative
increase  in  prices  during  1989.
As  to  currency  substitution,  the  shift  from  domestic  to  foreign  currency
deposits  was  halted  in  the  second  half  of  the  year,  and  the  share  of  foreign
currency  deposits  in  broad  money  declined  from  71  percent  in  June  to  69
percent  at  the  end  of  December.
The  tightening  of  bank  credit  to  enterprises  was  partially  compensated
for  by  the  flourishint  of  a  thick  inter-firm  credit  market,  which  partly
cushioned  the  enterprise  sector  from  the  squeeze  in  official  credit.  Inter-
firm  credit  declined  by  only  9  percent  in  real  terms  during  1989,  compared
20  The  government  did  not  anticipate  this  effect,  and  it  tried  to  reduce
the  wage-price  spiral  by lowering  the  coefficient  of indexation  and  forbidding
wage  increases  in  excess  of  the  indexation  rules.  With  accelerating
inflation,  however,  the  shortened  interval  of  adjustment  had  a  negative  impact
that  dominated  the  moderating  effects  of  the  reduced  coefficients  of
indexation.40
lith  a decline  of 65 porcent  In  real  torme  in  bank  credit  to the  non-
ovoarment sector. The  reoult  was a dramatic  increase  in the  size  of  inter-
Ylgm  credit  rolative  to official  credit,  from  63 percent  at  the  and  of 1988  to
145  porcont  at tho  and  of 1989.
To  sum up, tho deterioration in the macroeconomic situation  was  most
osevre  in tho first  half  of 1989. The  rapid  increase  in the  rate  of inflation
to almost  hyperinflat4.onary  levels  in  the  second  half  of 1989  was the  result
of a combination  of factors,  the  foremost  beings  the liberalization  of food
pricos; large adjustmento in administered prices, particularly  energy;
continuoue  devaluationo  of the  exchange  rate;  and  the formalization  of  a
backuard  wage  indoxation  scheme  with progressively  shorter  periodicity  for
adjustments. Accordingly,  wage indexation  and  the  exchange  rate  policy  turned
the "correctivon  increases  in the  price  level  associated  with the reduction  in
the  subsidies  for  food  and  energy  prices  (August  and  October)  into  sustained
higher  inflation. Moreover,  anticipation  of the  January  1990  program  is
likely  to have affected  developments  at the  end  of 1989  and  to have  exerted
further  pressure  on inflation. Significant  purchases  and  hoarding  by
households  were detected,  along  with the  accumulation  of inventories  by
enterprises. Finally,  the  wage spike  in December  1989  reflects  the
anticipation of the price  corrections carried out in  January  1990, since,
through  a complicated  indexation  rule,  the  December  increase  was linked  to
both  price  changes  in  November  and  expected  changes  in January.
The  Stabilization  ProSram  of January  1990
The  stabilization  pro  ram,  launched  on January  1,  can  be defined  as
heterodox,  with two  nominal  anchors,  the  nominal  wage and  the  exchange  rate,
and  fiscal  and  monetary  tightening. The  wage  policy  consisted  of a lagged
indexation  of the  wago  bill  with low  coefficients.
The  wage ceilings  were to 'je  enforced  through  a steeply  progressive  tax
penalty. The exchange  rate  was frozen  at 9,500  zlotys  per  US dollar,  after
the  unification  of the  parallel  and  official  markets,  and  the  decreed
"internal"  convertibility  of the  zloty  (for  current  account  operations  but  not
for  capital  account  operations). The  freeze  of the  exchange  rate  was preceded
by a sharp  depreciation  of 46 percent,  and  the  measure  resulted  in a
significant  overshooting  of the  parallel  market  rate  prevailing  on average  in
December  (about  30  percent). 22 It  was expected  that  the  exchange  rate  would
be defended  by a  special  fund (of  US$1  billion)  to  be made available  by
foreign  banks,  as  well aS  by the  interest  rate  policy.
The fiscal  components  relied  on a  balanced  budget,  to  be achieved  in
1990.  An increase  in  revenues  of about 4 percent of GDP and a  small reduction
21  The  wage bill  was indexed  to the  changes  in  prices  in  the  preceding
month  according  to  the  following  coefficients:  0.3 in  January,  0.2  in
February-April  (a  coefficient  that  was ultimately  maintained  through  June),  1
in  July and  0.6  thereafter. This  decision  was taken  to compensate  for  the
effects  on  real  wages  of the  administered  increase  of energy  prices  in July.
The  rationale  is not  fully  clear,  however,  because  by July  enterprises  had
accumulated  significant  room  to increase  their  wage ceilings,  as  in  the  first
six  months  they  had stayed  well below  the  ceilings  imposed.
22  The  parallel  market  was  very  volatile  in Decembers  while  the
reduction  in the  overhang  and  the  previous  real  exchange  rate  depreciations
pushed  the  parallel  rate  down  to the  level  of the  official  rate  in  mid-
December,  in the  last  days  of the  month  the  rate  approached  9,500  zlotys  in
anticipation  of the  decision  actually  made  on  January  1,  1990.41
in expenditures  of around  1  percent  of GDP  were to  produce  an adjustment  in
the  budget. The  government  undertook  discretionary  measures--which  were to
have supplemented  the  automatic  increase  in  real  revenues  from  the  expected
reversed  Olivera-Tanzi  effect--to  increase  revenues:  it  raised  the  basic  rate
of the turnover  tax  from  15 percent to 20 percent; it revalued tenfold the
fixed  assets  of the  socialized  enterprises,  the  basis  for  the  dividend  tax;
and it drastically  curtailed  tax  exemptions  and  relief. On the  expenditure
side, the main gains  were  expected to come from a reduction in  the subsidies
on the  order  of 8 percent  of GDP.
The  monetary  components  relied  on tight  credit  conditions  in the  firet
quarter  of 1990  that  were partly  loosened  in the  following  three  quarters  of
the  year.  Net domestic  assets  w  a  expected  to grow  by about  20  percent  in
nominal  terms  in the  first  qu.-cer,  a level  that  implies  a real  decline  of 30
percent,  and  to grow  at an average  quarterly  rate  of 7-8  percent  in the  rest
of the  year,  a level  that  is above  the  expected  rate  of inflation. This
policy  would have  guaranteed  a small  real  increase  in net  domestic  assets  by
the  end  of the  year.  The  credit  ceilings  were complemented  by an interest
rate  policy  geared  to  maintain  positive  real  rates  throughout  the  year.  Given
expected  inflation  of about  30-35  percent,  the  government  set  the  refinancing
rate  of the  National  Bank  of Poland,  which  was to serve  as a  sort  of leading
rate,  at 36  percent  in January.
Amendments  to the  banking  law  strengthened  the  independence  of the
central  bank.  This  measure  likely  signalled  to actors  in the  economy  that  the
central  bank  was abandoning  its  role  as lender  of last  resort.
Fundamental  liberalization  measures  accompanied  the  above  macroeconomic
policies. The  price  system  was liberalized  almost  entirely--only  5 percent  of
goods  sold  at the  retail  level  remain  subject  to price  controls--and
simultaneously  the  administered  prices  of energy  products  were raised  more
than  400  percent  so as to reduce  the  subsidies.  The  trade  system  was
liberalized  by abolishing  the  quantity  controls  on imports  and  replacing  them
with tariffs  and  by reducing  the  quotas  for  exports  of basic  commodities.
Finally,  the  government  announced  a  program  of privatization  and
restructuring  of the  industrial  sector,  including  new rules  establishing
triggers  for  the initiation  of bankruptcy  and restructuring  of enterprises.
In this  regard,  failure  to  pay the  dividend  tax  (a tax  on the  value  of the
funding  capital  of a  firm)  was  established  as the  main instrument  for
triggering  these  procedures.
To summarize,  the design of the program was  based on the assumption that
the  nominal  anchors  would  help  reduce  inflation  very fast,  and, accordingly,
monetary  balances  and  credit,  after  an initial  tight  condition  meant  to defend
the  nominal  anchors,  were expected  to grow  considerably  in real  terms  starting
in the  second  quarter  of 1990. The  planned  decline  in  real  terms  in the first
quarter  was based  on the  assumption  that  the  growth  of nominal  credit  and
monetary  aggregates  would  lag  behind  the  rate  of inflation,  pushed  up
temporarily  by the  increrne  in energy  prices. However,  it  was thought  that
the  decline  in real  wage-  would  give  room  to enterprises  to absorb  the  price
shock  (see  also  Lipton  and  Sachs  1990). That the  program  was not  intended  to
squeeze  aggregate  demand  can  be inferred  from  the  expectation  of a current
account  deficit  of more than  7  percent  of  GDP in 1990  (compared  with a deficit
of 2.6  percent  of GDP in 1989).
Initial  Results
The initial  results  of the  stabilization  program  can  be characterized  as
stagflationary,  at least  in  the first  two  months  following  the  start  of the
stabilization  measures.  A sharp  drop in  output  was accompanied  by an42
acceleration  in the  rate  of inflation,  which  remained  persistent  and
relatively  high given  the  depressed  economy. Using  a terminology  auBgested  by
Polish  economists  (Kolodko  and  McMahon  1987),  the  economy  experienced  a shift
from  a  condition  of shortage-flation--given  by the  combination  of  high
inflation  and  large  shortages  of goods--to  one  of stagflation.
The rate  of inflation,  after  jumping  to 78.6  percent  in  January  1990,
declined  to 23.9  percent  in  February  and  to an average  monthly  rate  of 5
percent  in  March-June. After  falling  to 1.8  percent  in  August,  it  bounced
back to 4.7  percent  in September  and  5.7  percent  in  October,  4.9  in  November
and 5.9  in December  pushed  by the  large  increases  in the  prices  of oil
products  and  administered  prices. Notwithstanding  the external  negative  shock
and successive  increases  in  administered  prices,  the  persistently  high rate  of
inflation,  which  oscillated  around  4 percent  per  month  for  more than  10
months,  was unexpected. Given  the  larger  than  anticipated  fiscal  adjustment
and  drop  in output,  this  persistence  was puzzling,  although  it is similar  in
some  ways to Brazil  and  Argentina's  exPerience  with stabilization  programs.
When fiscal  and  monetary  explanations  for  this  phenomenon  are  ruled  out,  the
main factors  can  be identified  as: (1)  the  slow  movement  toward  a  higher
equilibrium  price  level  for  both  tradable  and  non-tradable  goods;  and (2)  the
de facto  high  degree  of indexation  of  wages to  prices  since  March  1990.
The profile  of the  decline  in  output  shows  that  the drop  was concentrated
at the  beginning  of the  program  and  that  thereafter  output  remained
practically  flat,  with some  signs  of a  possible  recovery  surfacing  in  August-
September.  Along  with the  decline  in output  sold,  initially  enterprises  drew
down  significant  quantities  of inventories  of both inputs  and  finished
products.  Employment  in  the  socialized  sector  responded  with a lag  to the  drop
in output,  and in the  year as a  whole  employment  was about  10  percent  below
its  level  in the  same  period  in 1989. Unemployment,  practically  non-existent
before  1990,  increased  after  February  1990  at an average  of 100,000  people  per
month,  reaching  about  1.15  million  people  in  December  (more  than  6  percent  of
the  labor  force).  "Statistical"  real  wages declined  sharply  in the  first  six
months  of 1990,  while they  increased  significantly  in the  third  quarter  (about
20  percent  over the  second  quarter)  and  fourth  quarter. Despite  this
increase,  in the  year as a  whole,  they  declined  by about  30  percent.
Marked  improvements  took  place  in  both the  fiscal  and  the  external
accounts.  The fiscal  accounts  moved  into  a sizable  surplus  in the  first  half
of 1990  (about  3 percent  of  GDP  was expected  for  the  whole  year),  despite  the
acceleration  in inflation  in the  first  quarter  and  the  decline  in output. The
improvement  continued  in the  third  quarter,  although  a deficit  was experienced
in the  last  quarter  of 1990. The  main factor  behind  this  unexpected  surplus
was a  surge  in tax  revenues,  mainly  on enterprise  profits,  which at the  end  of
1989 (which  is the  tax  base for  1990  payments)  were much larger  than
anticipated  as a result  of large  capital  gains  on enterprise  dollar  deposits.
The trade  balance  displayed  a remarkable  improvement,  with a surplus  of  US$2.7
billion  (for  convertible  currency  trade)  in  the  year  as  a whole,  with  exports
in convertible  currencies  increasing  by  more than 40  percent  and  imports
increasing  by 10  percent. The  change  in gross  reserves  fully  reflected  the
improvement  in the current  account.
On the  monetary  side,  net  domestic  assets  grew  well below  the  ceilings  of
the  program  in the first  half  of the  year,  while the  growth  of the  stock  of
money  was in line  with nominal  targets  because  of the  monetization  of foreign
reserves  (table  1-3).
This trend  was reversed  in  the  second  half  of the  year,  however,  and  the
Net  domestic  assets  of the  banking  sector  (NDA)  overshot  the  credit  ceilings
of the  program. While the  contemporaneous  increase  in real  wages and  real43
Table  1-30  Poland:  Monetary  Survee.  December  1989-SePtember  1990
(trillion  zlotys,  end  of the  period)
1989.IV  1990.I  1990.II  1990.111  1990.IV
Gross  reserves  24.1  26.8  36.7  50.4  46.8
Domestic  credit  40.0  50.8  63.4  81.8  110.4
Credit  to  government
(not)  6.5  2.7  -11.1  -18.1  -8.2
Credit  to  non-gov't  33.5  48.1  74.5  99.9  118.6
Other  31.8  35.3  36.5  35.0  34.8
Broad  money  96.0  112.9  136.6  169.2  192.0
Inter-firm  credit  47.3  75.1  82.6  77.3  82.6k
a.  November.
Source: National  Bank  of Poland.
credit  raises  concerns  about  possible  excess  liquidity  in the  system,  the
evidence  for  the  third  quarter,  particularly  the  continued  increase  in foreign
reserves,  points  to a "remonetization"  of the  economy  . It is  vorth  noting
that  part  of the increase  in  bank credit  appears  to  have resulted  from  the
substitution  of inter-firm  credit  with bank  credit,  a  positive  phenomenon.
Developments  in the  fourth  quarter  were  more  worrisome,  however,  as the
financing  needs  of the  government  sector  increased  with the  shift  to a  budget
deficit. The  real  decline  in  the stocks  of money  and  credit  has  been
substantial.
In the  first  quarter,  net  domestic  assets  and  broad  money  declined  by 54
percent  and 44  percent  in real  terms,  respectively.  In the  second  quarter  net
domestic  assets  continued  to decline  in real  terms,  while  broad  money
increased  in real  terms  because  of the  large  inflows  of international
reserves.
The  National  Bank  refinancing  rate  was set  according  to expected
inflation,  the  aim  being  to  produce  slightly  positive  real  rates. In  January,
the  refinancing  rate  was 36  percent,  in  February  20  percent,  in  March 10
percent,  in  April 8  percent,  in  May  5.5  percent  and  in June  4 percent. After
declining  to 2.5  percent  in  July-September,  it  was raised  to 3.5  percent  in
October  and  again  to 4.5  percent  in  November,  following  the  increase  in the
rate  of inflation. Ex post,  tne  rates  were negative  in real  terms  in January-
February  and  roughly  in line  with inflation  in the  following  months.
The  magnitude  of the initial  results  was largely  unexpected;  the
discrepancy  is so large  that  the  normal  bias,  which  often  seems  to
23  Moreover,  almost  half  the increase  in  credit  to  non-government  was
channelled  to the  non-socialized  sector:  households,  farmers  and  private
firms.44
characterize  predictions  about  stabilization  programs,  whereby  inflatiou  tends
to be underestimated  and growth  overestimated,  cannot  explain  it. 2"
Before  turning  to  possible  interpretations  of the  initial  results,  it is
important  to emphasize  that there  were  no slippages  in the  implementation  of
the  program  during  the first  semester. More controversial  is the issue  of
slippages  in the  second  half in the  areas  of  both credit  and  wage policies.
However,  given  that in  both areas  developments  in the  first  semester  were  well
below  the  targets  of the  program,  it is  not too  surprising  that  some
overshooting  took  place  it.  the  second  semester.
Obviously,  the  real issue  is  whether  these  trends  are  sustainable  in
future  months  and  consistent  with  a decline  in inflation. In the  first
semester  the  two  nominal  anchors  of the  program,  the  exchange  rate  and  the
nominal  wage,  were  maintained  without  trouble  and  actually  appeared  to  be non-
binding  as  the increase  in  wages  stood  below  the  ceilings  and the  exchange
rate  stabilization  fund  made  available  by  western  countries  was not  used,  with
a build-up  of international  reserves. As to the  monetary  program,  the
ceilings  (on  both  net  credit  to the  government  and  net  domestic  assets)  were
respected  with ample  margins,  and interest  rates  were set  as programmed.
Although  some  overshooting  of the  targets  took  place  in  the  third  quarter,
even then  no pressure  was exerted  on the  exchange  rate,  and  the  wage increases
were consistent  with the  original  indexation  scheme,  given  that  the increases
derived  from  use of the  "reserve"  accumulated  in the  first  quarter,  when wages
rose  well below  the  norm.
Assessment  of the  most recent  trends  and  the  policy  prescriptions  for  the
next  mQnths  depend  crucially  on  the  analysis  of the  results  of the  program  so
far, in  particular  of the  unexpected  outcomes,  such  as the  sharp  recession,
the fiscal  improvement  and  the  sizable  current  account  surplus. One  possible,
and  actually  widespread,  reading  of the  initial  results  of the  program
interprets  the  recession  as a standard  Keynesian  demand  contraction
phenomenon. For  Poland,  the  appearance  of demand  barriers  would certainly
represent  a fundamental  break  with the  Past,  when the  economy  was
traditionally  supply  constrained. The large  drop  in real  wages  would  thus  be
the  main source  of the  contraction  in output,  and  the  larger  than  expected
decline  in output  would seem  consistent  with the  larger  than  expected  fall  in
real  wages.
Without  denying  the  possibility  that  this  drop ill  demand  could  have  been
the  source  of the  drop  in output,  several  doubts  can  be raised. First,  it is
widely  recognized  that  in 1989,  at least  in  the first  three  quarters,  the
economy  experienced  excess  demand,  with  worsening  shortages. Therefore,  when
real  wages are  measured  using  official  price  indices,  they  reflect--in  the
terminology  of Polish  economists--"statistical"  rather  than  actual  real  wages
(see  also  Lipton  and  Sachs  1990). These  "statistical"  real  wages largely
overestimate  real  purchasing  power  in 1989  and  thus  overestimate  the  drop in
real  purchasing  power  in 1990,  as  measured  by the  decline  in the "statistical"
real  wages.
Second,  measured  retail  prices  likely  overestimate  the  actual  rates  of
inflation,  as a significant  proporticn  of retail  trade  in 1990  took  place
outside  the  state  distribution  channels,  at  prices  estimated  to be 20-30
percent  below  officially  recorded  prices.
Third,  the  downturn  in production  actually  began  in 1989,  specifically,
in the second  half,  when "statistical"  real  wages  were still  well above  their
1988  levels.
24  van  Wijnbergen  (1982)  has  emphasized  the  presence  of a consistent
bias of this  type in IMF-supported  stabilization  programs.45
Fourth,  although  a  decline  in domestic  demand  was clearly  envisioned  in
the  program,  an increase  in foreign  demand  should  have  sustained  output.
Finally,  the  behavior  of the  financial  savings  of households  appears  at
odds  with the  view of a household  sector  experiencing  severely  constrained
liquidity  forced  to adjust  its  demand  for  goods  downward. In particular,  the
availability  of a  large  stock  of foreign  currency  deposits  made  by the
household  sector--which  is an abstraction  from  distributional  issues,  which
may  be important--means  that  households  were not  constrained  in  borrowing  at
the  outset  of the  program  for  the  most part.  Given  the  temporary  character  of
the  income  policy  scheme,  it remains  to  be explained  why households  did  not
deplete  their  stock  of foreign  currency  deposits  to protect  their  levels  of
consumption. Indeed,  in  US dollar  terms,  household  deposits  in foreign
currency  increased  in the  first  six  months  following  the  start  of the  program
(table  1-4).
Table 1-4. Poland:  Foreign  Currency  Deposits
(billions  of UMS)
1988  1989  1990
IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III
Total  5.4  5.8  6.8  7.2  7.2  6.0  5.9  6.2
Households  4.3  4.5  4.5  4.8  4.9  5.0  5.2  5.6
Enterprises  1.1  13  2e3  2.4  2.3  1.0  0.7  0.6
Sources National  Bank  of Poland.
More generally,  a  main limitation  of the  above  view is  that it  takes  as
exogenous  elements  that  are  actually  endogenous,  particularly  the  decline  in
rea  wares,  which  is assumed  to be the  ultimate  source  of the  decline  in
output.
An alternative  explanation  that  is favored  here  emphasizes  that  the focus
of the stagflationary  effects  of the  program  should  be on the  enterprise
sector  and  its  reaction  to the large  supply  shock  arising  from  the  elimination
of the subsidies  for  both  input  prices  and  interest  rates. According  to this
view,  the credit  crunch  associated  with both  the  policy-determined  tightening
of official  credit  and  the  sudden  increase  in credit  risk  played  the  main role
in transmitting  the  effects  of the  initial  supply  shock.
25  The  policy  implications  of this  demand-led  view of the  recession  are
straightforward:  they  imply  some  form  of demand  stimulus. However,  the
stimulus  can  be achieved  with different  policies  and  different  degrees  of
policy  activism. A "non-activist"  possibility  would  be not to change  the
policies  and  to let the  decline  in inflation,  induced  by the  contraction  in
demand,  reconstitute  real  monetary  balances,  and  hence  demand  and  output. A
more activist  approach  would favor  either  increasing  demand  through  a looser
wage  policy  or  more  expansionary  fiscal  policy  or turning  monetary  policy
around  with a  much  more accommodative  credit  policy  (similarly  to the  recent
experience  in China  in 1990).46
While  it  ha  generally  been  observed  that  the  jump  in  the  rate  of
inflation  can  reflect  the  effects  of  the  price  liberalization  in  the  context
of  the  liquidity  overhang,  the  larger  than  expected  increase  in  the  rate  of
inflation  in  January  can  be  mainly  ascribed  to  cost-push  factors  linked  to  the
devaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  and  to  the  lifting  of  the  subsidies  decreed
at the  outset  of the  program  as  a  main  element  in the rationalization  of the
price  system.  While  the  importance  of  these  targets  to  achieving  greater
efficiency  in  the  economy  and  to  reducing  pressures  on  the  budget  is  not
questioned  here,  it  is  Important  to  stress  that  the  recessionary  iact  of  a
tightening  of  credit  when  there  is  a  large  increase  in  the  prices  of  inputs
has been  overlooked.  In  Calvo  and  Coricelli  (1990),  it  is  estimated,  although
with an admittedly  rough  calculation,  that  the  credit  crunch,  measured  as the
gap  between  actual  and  required  liquidity,  necessary  to  permit  enterprises  to
maintain  the  same level  of production  of 1989  was  on  the  order  of 60 percent
at  the  beginning  of  1990. To  appreciate  the  magnitude  of  the  crunch,  note
that  in  January  1990  working  capital  credit  from  the  banking  system  to  the
socialized  sector  declined  in  nominal  terms--in  a  context  of  increased  prices
for  domestic  inputs  of  400  percent  and  of  large  increases  in  the  prices  of
foreign  inputs  as  a  result  of  the  devaluation  at  the  outset  of  the  program,
and  of  a  jump  in  interest  rate  costs.
Although  the  squeeze  somehow  loosened  in  the  following  months,  by  the  end
of  June  1990 the  stock  of  credit  to  the  non-government  sector  was  20  percent
below  its  level  in  real  terms  at  the  end  of  1989. This  partial  loosening  of
the credit squeeze  seems  consistent  with the fact that, after dropping sharply
in  January,  industrial  output  remained  flat  in  the  following  months.  A
similar  argument  applies  to  the  third  quarter,  which  shows  some  recovery  in
economic  activity.  At  the  end  of  the  third  quarter,  real  credit  to  the  non-
government  sector  had  essentially  recovered  its  level  of  December  1989. In
the  fourth  quarter  credit  to  the  socialized  sector  declined  in  real  terms
while  production  remained  flat.
In  a  static  framework,  the  sharp  reduction  in  subsidies  for  enterprises
represents  a  supply  shock  that  even  in  a  competitive  industry  would  cause  a
reduction  in  output  and  an  increase  in  prices.  This  simple  story  seems  to
accord  with  several  phenomena  characterizing  the  first  results  of  the
stabilization  program.  However,  it  would  imply  a  simple  shift  from  a
distorted  equilibrium  to  an  undistorted  and  efficient  equilibrium.  At  the
micro  level,  this  explanation  suggests  that  firms  operating  only  thanks  to
subsidies  should  have  gone  bankrupt  after  the  elimination  of  these  subsidies,
while  efficient  firms  should  have  survived  after  the  Big  Bang. However,  the
first  months  following  the  stabilization  display  a  different  picture  that
indicates  a  widespread  recession  without  significant  bankruptcies.  This
phenomenon  casts  doubt  on  the  working  of  a  Schumpeteriar,  efficient  natural
selection.
The  explanation  postulated  here  without  denying  the  relevance  of  the
above  static  factors,  relies  on  a  different  mechanism.  Specifically,  it
emphasizes  the  role  of  the  credit  markets  in  transmitting  the  effects  of  the
supply  shock.  The  sharp  reduction  in  the  stock  of  real  credit  from  both  the
banking  system  and  within  the  enterprise  sector  itself  accounts  for  the
observed  recession.2
6 By increasing  the  price  of inputs,  the stock  of
liquidity  necessary  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  to  operate  at  the  old  level
of  production  increased  sharply.  The  lack  of  a  sufficient  stock  of  liquidity
likely  induced  firms  to  reduce  their  purchases  of  inputs,  with  a  consequent
fall  in  output.  This  phenomenon,  which  is  related  to  the  adequacy  of  the
initial  stock  of  liquidity,  occurs  independently  of  the  behavior  of  the  price
of  outputs.  The  increase  in  prices,  accompanied  by  the  compression  in  real
26  Calvo  and  Coricelli  (1990)  provide  a  simple  analytical  model  that
illustrates  this  phenomenon.47
wages,  helped  firms  reconstitute  their  liquidity.  Accordingly,  both  the  fall
1n  real  wages  and  the  good  profit  performance  of  Polish  industry  during  the first  months  of  the  deep  recession  can  be  explained.  The  good  profit
performance  of  enterprises  in  particular  is  puzzling  for  those  vho  share  the
view  that  a recession  is  induced  by  "demand  barriers."
The  actual  working  of  the  credit  crunch  and  the  relative  role  of  the quantity  of  credit  versus  its  cost  (interest  rate)  are  still  uncertain,  given
the  presence  of  direct  controls  over  bank  credit.
In  this  connection,  the  behavior  of  the  inter-firm  credit  market  may rovide  important  clues.  As  noted,  in  1989  the  stock  of  inter-firm  credit,
despite  a  slight  decline  in  real  terms,  grew  much  faster  than  official  bank
credit  did. According  to  data  up  to  March  1990,  although  smaller  than  the
decline  in  official  credit,  the  stock  of  inter-firm  credit  declined  by  about 33  percent  in  real  terms  in  the  first  quarter  of  1990  (compared  with  a  decline
bn  ank  credit  of  46  percent  in  real  terms  in  the  same  period).  It  continued
to  decline  in  real  terms  in  the  second  quarter  and  also  in  relation  to  bank
credit.  Starting  in  July  it  even  declined  in  nominal  terms.  In  the  remaining
months  of  1990  it  Therefore,  the  inter-firm  market  did  not  provide  a  relevant
cushion  to  the  squeeze  of  official  credit.  Moreover,  it  is  conjectured  here
that  a  large  component  of  inter-firm  credit  in  1990  represents  an  accumulation
of  arrears  rather  than  a  "voluntary"  extension  of  new  credit.  This  phenomenon
is  consistent  with  the  view  of  a  sudden  increase  in  credit  risk,  likely
associated  with  the  si  naled  withdrawal  of  the  central  bank  from  its  role  as
lender  of  last  resort.
The  extremely  simplified  mechanism  just  described  has  to  be  amended  to
accommodate  the  impressive  improvement  in  the  trade  balance  observed  after
January  1990. Indeed,  in  general  recessions  led  by  temporary  supply  shocks
should  result  in  a  worsening  of  the  trade  balance  (consumption  tends  to
decline  less  than  output).'  However,  if  the  behavior  of  inventories  held  by
enterprises  is considered  as  well,  the  "model"  used  here  can  account  for  a
temporary  improvement  in  the  trade  balance.  The  liquidity  crunch  will  induce
enterprises  to  deplete  their  stock  of  inventories  to  reconstitute  their  liquid
balances--in  other  words,  there  will  be  a  shift  in  the  "portfolio"  of
enterprises  from  inventories  to  money.  As  a  result,  total  absorption  in  the
economy  by  households  and  enterprises  can  decline  more  than  output--although
the  decline  in  consumption  falls  short  of  the  decline  in  output--and  thereby yields  an  improvement  in  the  trade  balance.  The  data  on  inventories  are,
however,  ambiguous,  as  inventory  accounting  is  unclear.  According  to  the
authors'  calculations,  the  stock  of  inventories  declined  sharply  at  the
beginning  of  1990  and  at  the  end  of  September  was  still  well  below  its  level
in  1989.
Demand-side  factors  certainly  played  a  role. Household  savings  increased
during  the  year  so  that  no  consumption  "smoothing"  took  place.  This  increase
occurred  as  households  likely  tried  to  reconstitute  their  real  stock  of
financial  wealth,  eroded  by  high  inflation  (see  Frydman  and  Wellisz  1990).  In
addition,  the  increase  in  unemployment  could  have  induced  an  increase  in
precautionary  savings.  Finally,  a  further  element  (mentioned  in  the  main
27  In  addition,  the  central  bank  strengthened  its  supervision  of  the
criteria  that  commercial  banks  follow  in extending  credit. It  apPears  that  an
assessment  of  creditworthiness  is  a  condition  for  the  extension  of  credit.
26  The  fall  in  Gupply  reduces  the  permanent  income  of  workers-
households,  which  accordingly  reduce  their  consumption.  Therefore,  the  fall in  real  wages  and  in  consumption  is  a  response  to  the  credit  crunch  and  the
attendant  fall  in  supplies,  and  not  an  exogenous  source  of  the  recession.48
text)  might  have  been  the  shift  in  the  distribution  of  income  in  favor  of
prof  its.APPENDIX  B
STABILIZATION  IN YUGOSLAVIA
Backaround
The  reversal  of  external  financing  flows  during  the 1980s  forced
Yugoslavia  to undertake  drastic  measures  to  balance  its  external  accounts.
The  external  adjustment  consisted  primarily  of large  real  exchange  rate
devaluations  and, initially,  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports. Although
these  measures  were able  to generate  increasing  current  account  surpluses,
economic  activity  stagnated  and  inflation  accelerated  almost  continuously
(figure  2.1).  Moreover,  the  absence  of fiscal  imbalances  in  the  economy  might
suggest  that  the  nature  of  inflation  in  Yugoslavia  is entirely  non fiscal.
While it is true  that  many  hyperinflation  episodes  are  triggered  by
balance  of payments  difficulties  and large  exchange  rate  devaluations,  the
complete  absence  of fiscal  imbalances  from  the  overall  picture  in the  case  of
Yugoslavia  is intriguing. Indeed,  even  the  "balance  of payments  view of
inflation"  recognizes  the  role  of fiscal  deficits  in the  determination  of
inflation,  although  such  role  is assumed  to be less  central  than  under  the
"fiscal  view  of inflation". In the  former,  the  exchange  rate  assumes  the
central  role,  while  fiscal  deficits  contribute  to inflation  mostly  through
endogenous  interactions  with the  exchange  rate  and  the inflation  rate itself
(see  for  instance,  Dornbusch  1987;  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  1986;  Liviatan  and
Piterman  1986;  and  Montiel  1989).
This appendix  will show that,  while  non-fiscal  factors  played  a role  in
the  acceleration  of inflation  during  the 1980s,  especially  at the  end  of the
decade,  the  existence  of fundamental  domestic  imbalances  also contributed
decisively  to the  inflationary  process. These  fundamental  imbalances  were
originally  located  in large  segments  of the  enterprise  sector,  but  gradually
spilled  over to the  financial  system,  resulting,  among  other  things,  in a
quasi-fiscal  deficit  in the  central  bank  29.
A major  non-fiscal  factor  that  contributed  to  higher  inflation  was the
need to reduce  real  wages and  ensure  a given  real  devaluation  of the  exchange
rate--the  Pazos-Simonsen  mechanism  (see  Dornbusch  1987;  Dornbusch  and  Simonsen
1988;  Pazos 1978;  and  Simonsen  1989)e  This  mechanism  became  more important
after  the  introduction  of  wage indexation  in 1987.  In  particular,  the  large
real  devaluation  of  mid-1988  (figure  2.2)  in the  context  of  wage indexation
and  monetary  accommodation  triggered  a  significant  increase  in the  rate  of
inflation. (figure  2.3). During  the  last  three  quarters  of 1989,  the
relation  between  real  wages and  inflation  changed. During  this  period,  wage
demands  were driven  by expectations  of a future  wage freeze,  leading  to a 40
percent  increase  in  real  wages and  a  dramatic  acceIeration  of inflation  as
shown  in figures  2.2  and  2.3 (see  Helpman  and  Leiderman  1990,  for  a  model  of
inflation  based  on real  wage increases).
29  More detailed  analysis  of inflation  in  Yugoslavia  are  provided  in
Rocha (1991),  Bole  and  Gaspari  (1990),  Gaspari  (1988),  Mates (1987),  and
Mencinger  (1987).50
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As to the  fundamentals,  the  imbalances  in the  Yugoslav  economy
originiated,  as noted,  in large  segments  of the  enterprise  sector. Already  in
the  late 19709  a significant  number  of enterprises  were recording  losses.
During  the 1980s  the  amount  of the  losses  increased  significantly  (table  2-1).
Although  these  numbers  are  affected  by many accounting  problems,  they indicate
a  deteriorating  trend  that  is  highly  probable. One  likely  cause  for  this
increase  in losses  was the  sharp  real  devaluations  undertaken  in the  mid-1980s
(enterprises  initially  held 80  percent  of  Yugoslavia's  external  debt).
Another  likely  cause  was  the  growingnumbers  of redundant  workers  in  the
enterprises,  estimated  to  have reached  20  percent  of  the  labor  force  in
1988.,
An  obvious  question is how the enterprise losses were financed.  During
the  1980s  there  were two  basic  sources  of financing. The first  comprised
various  forms  of int6r-enterprise  financing,  including  voluntary  transfers
from  profit-makers  to loss-makers  inside  the  same  industrial  holding,  as  well
as inter-enterprise  credits  and  arrears. The second  consisted  of bank  credits
on subsidized  terms. The  banks,  which  were  controlled  by the  enterprises,
were able to continue  this  policy  of credit  subsidies  until  almost  the  end  of
the decade only by paying  even more negative real interest rates on domestic
deposits.
During  the 1980.  enterprises'  financial  imbalances  spilled  over  into  the
central  bank.  Several  enterprises  revealed  themselves  unable  to service  their
foreign  liabilities. The  central  bank  absorbed  the  foreign  liabilities  of
enterPrises  located  in less  developed  regions,  thus  adding  to its  own  foreign
liabilities. The central  bank  also  absorbed  the  stock  of foreign  exchange
(FX)  deposits  in the  commercial  banks,  a  measure  designed  to protect  the  banks
from  foreign  exchange  losses 31. The  reluctance  of the  central  bank to charge
positive  real interest  rates  on its  credits,  while facing  mounting  payments  on
its  foreign  liabilities  resulted  in a quasi-fiscal  deficit  that  constituted  an
independent  source  of monetary  expansion.
Ultimately,  inflation  in  Yugoslavia  engineered  a complex  distribution  of
real  resources,  from  holders  of domestic  assets  and  towards  the  financing  of
hidden  losses  in the  system. This  process  of redistribution  gained  momentum
in the 1980s, as  a  result of the reversal of financing flows and the
successive  exchange  rate shocks  in the  economy. Indeed,  the  phenomenon  of
accelerating  inflation  in  Yugoslavia  can  also  be interpreted  as resulting  from
an external-internal  transfer  problem,  like  the  case  of other  debtor  countries
(see  Cohen 1988). The  ultimate  beneficiaries  of such  internal  redistribution
were the  enterprises,  which  were the  major  recipients  of Dinar  credits  at
subsidized  terms,  and  the  holders  of foreign  exchange  deposits.
so  See  Mencinger  (1989). That  should  be compared  with an open
unemployment  figure  of 14  percent.
31  The stock  of FX deposits  (mostly  held  by residents)  is not  part  of
Yugoslavia's  external  debt.  In the  early  19809,  the  stocks  of external  debt
and  FX deposits  amounted  to US$  20 billion  and  11  billion,  respectively.52
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Table  2.1
Enterprise  Looses
(in  2  of  GSP)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Enterprise
Lossess  1.6  1.3  2.2  2.9  2.1  2.8  3.0  6.6  5.7  15.0
Seignorage  on
Base  Moneys  1.8  2.7  2.7  1.6  3.9  3.6  4.2  4.9  5.7  12.0
Soure.:  SDRK,  NBY,  Knight  (1984)  and  Rocha  (1989  and  1990)
The  precise  magnitude  of  the  inflationary  financing  of  hidden  losses  i;
difficult  to  assess.  On  the  one  hand,  not  all  the  seignorage  revenues  on  base
money  (changes  in  base  money  as  shares  of  GSP)  shown  in  table  1  were
channelled  towards  the  financing  of  hidden  losses.  For  instance,  in  1988  and
1989  roughly  half  of  seignorage  revenues  on  base  money  were  absorbed  by  the
large  build-up  of  foreign  reserves  that  preceded  the  stabilization  program.
On  the  other  hand,  the  base  of  inflationary  taxation  was  broader  than  base
money,  since  it  included  the  whole  Dinar  deposit  base. The  introduction  of
indexation  on  time  deposits  above  three  months  in  mid-1988  reduced  the  base  of
inflationary  taxation.  However,  the  implicit  taxation  of  shorter-term
denosits  remained  substantial 32,
The  combination  of  accelerating  inflation  and  negative  real  interest
rates  on  deposits  resulted  in  a  drastic  portfolio  shift  out  of  domestic
assets,  as  illustrated  in  figure  2.4. The  share  of  foreign  exchange  deposits
in  broad  money  increased  from  less  than  30  percent  at  the  start  of  the  decade
to  more  than  65  percent  in  1989. It  is  quite  possible  that  the  existence  of
FX  deposits  facilitated  the  shift  out  of  domestic  money,  thus  also
contributing  to  inflation  by  accelerating  the  increase  in  velocity.
The failure  to correct  the  internal  imbalances  was a  major  cause  of the
failure  of  the  several  stabilization  attempts  of  the  mid-1980s,  which  relied
mostly  on  wage-price  controls.  Particularly  noteworthy  was  the  stabilization
program  of  mid-1988,  which  attempted  to  curb  inflation  essentially  through  the
establishment  of  progressively  declining  targets  on  the  growth  of  money  and
wages,  and  the  indexation  of  time  deposits.  This  measure  was  introduced  as  an
attempt  to  reduce  the  subsidization  of  credits  and  to  impose  financial
discipline  on  enterprises.  No  fiscal  support  to  stabilization  was  envisaged
in  the  1988  program.
32  Therefore,  the  impressive  correlation  between  enterprise  losses  and
seignorage  in  table  2.1  is  somewhat  misleading,  since  the  central  bank  did  not
finance  enterprises  directly.  The  inflationary  financing  of  all  hidden  losses
is  more  complex,  involving  the  financing  of  central  bank  losses  from  base
money  creation  and  the  financing  of  enterprise  losses  through  subsidized  bank
credits.  See  Rocha  (1991).54
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The  inconsistencies  of the  mid-1988  program  were  aggravated  by a real
devaluation  whose  rationale  was  unclear,  since  the  country  was  already  running
a large  current  account  surplus  and  was also engaged  in debt  rescheduling
negotiations  with  private  foreign  banks. In  fact,  the  real  devaluation
defeated  one  of  the  main  purposes  of  the  external  debt  rescheduling,  which  was
to relieve  the  pressure  of external  debt  payments  on the  domestic  economy.
The  attempt  to  maintain  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciated  in  the  context
of  formal  wage  indexation  resulted  in  a strong  acceleration  of  wages  and
Prices,  as  noted  above.  The  real  devaluation  also  increased  the  burden  of
foreign  interest  payments,  thus  offsetting  in  part  the  benefits  of  the
rescheduling  of  commercial  debt. The  pressure  to  finance  hidden  losses,
particularly  the  central  bank's  own  deficit,  led  policy-makers  to  abandon  the
monetary  targets  soon  after  their  implementation.  Faced  with  higher  real
interest  rates  on  bank  credits  several  enterprises  simply  stopped  paying,
aggravating  considerably  the  already  severe  problem  of  non-performing  loans  in
the  commercial  banks.
Develogments  in  1989  and  Preparations  for  the  1990  Program.
The  failure  of  the  1988  stabilization  program  showed  the  futility  of
implementing  another  program  without  addressing  the  fundamental  domestic
imbalances.  Thus,  during  1989,  consensus  was  reached  about  ths  need  to
generate  a  surplus  in  the  nou-financial  public  sector  in  order  to  cover  losses
elsewhere  in  the  econom  ,  even  though  there  was  less  certainty  about  the
required  magnitude  of  the  fiscal  adjustment,  as  well  as  the  best  strategy  for
dealing  witfh  the  loss-makers.
In  the  case  of  the  central  bank's  own  deficit,  the  solution  was  clear,
consisting  basically  of  the  transfer  of  the  servicing  of  its  foreii;n  exchange
liabilities  and  agriculture  subsidies  to  the  federal  budget.  In  the  case  of
enterprises  and  comercial  banks,  the  situation  was  less  clear.  Although
enterprise  losses  were  regularly  calculated,  frequent  changes  in  accounting55
rules  and  a  lack  of  harmonization  in  accounting  procedures  decreased  the
re'anee  on  available  figures.  The  situation  of  commercial  banks  was  not
fully  transparent  either.  While  the  share  of  non-performing  loans  was  known
to  be  large,  but  the  available  estimates  were  still  tentative.
More important,  the  design  of  a  well-defined  strategy  to  deal  with  the
lose-makers  had  not  been  completed.  For  instance,  there  were  still  doubts  of
whether  to  provide  a  fiscal  subsidy  to  loss-makers,  while  submitting  them  to
restructuring  programs  (involving  lay-offs,  debt  write-off.,  selective
improving  investments,  changes  in  management,  etc.),  or  whether  to  let  the
Darwinian-Schumpeterian  law  of natural  selection  operate  freely. In this
case,  the  number  o'  bankruptcies  Was  expected  to  increase  much  more  rapidly,
and  the  fiscal  resources  would  be directed  towards  social  programs,  as opposed
to  the  loss-making  enterpriseb  themselves.  Finally,  although  privatization
was  already  accepted  as  an  essential  component  of  the  overall  strategy,  the
mechanisms  and  timing  of  its  introduction,  as  well  as  its  interactions  with
the  restructuring  program,  had  not  been  fully  worked  out.
During  1989,  progress  in  the  establishment  of  the  preconditions  for  a
stabilization  pro6ram  was  more  advanced  in  the  macroeconomic  area. First,  the
debt  rescheduling  agreements  ef  mid-1988  and  the  large  current  account  surplus
achieved  in  1989  (US$  2.4  billion)  resulted  in  an  increase  in  international
reserves  from  US$  3.3  to  US$  6.1  billion.  An  adequate  level  of  reserves  was
deemed  essential  to  ensure  the  initial  credibility  in  the  program,  which  was
to  include  the  introduction  of  currency  convertibility" 3 and  a  substantial
degree  of  import  liberalization.  In  the  fiscal  area,  all  the  changes  in
legislation  required  for  the  transfer  of  the  fiscal  operations  of  the  central
bank  to  the  federal  budget  and  the  introduction  of  a  new  sales  tax  were
completed.
The  dramatic  acceleration  of  inflation  in  1989  (figure  2.3)  affected  the
elaboration  of  a  stabilization  program  that  same  year. As  noted  above,
several  causes  contributed  to  such  acceleration.  First,  the  attempt  to
maintain  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciated  in  the  presence  of  wage  indexation
required  an  acceleration  of  inflation  to  achieve  a  reduction  of  the  real  wage.
Second,  in  the  last  three  quarters  of  1989  the  real  exchange  rate  target  was
partly  abandoned,  but  the  very  strong  increase  in  real  wages  kept  the
pressures  on  inflation.  Finally,  the  hidden  losses  in  the  economy  had  not
been  eliminated  and  still  constituted  a  permanent  source  of  monetary  expansion
and  inflatlon.  In  addition,  during  1989  the  pressures  on  money  supply  were
compounded  by  the  large  build-up  of  foreign  reserves  by  the  central  bank. The
perception  that  inflation  was  running  completely  out  of  control  motivated  the
launching  of  the  plan  at  mid-  December,  despite  of  the  awareness  of  some  loose
ends.
The  Stabilization  Prosram  of  1990
The stabilization  program  of 1990,  as  it  was called,  contained  a  variety
of  measures  in  the  areas  of  income,  fiscal,  monetary  and  trade  policy.  The
program  also  included  a  currency  reform  that  eliminated  four  zeros  off  the  old
gugoslav  Dinar. The  program  can  be  classified  as  heterodox,  even  though  it
did  not  include  the  imposition  of  widespread  price  controls  for  goods  and
services  as  happened  under  other  heterodox  programs  of  the  mid-eighties.  In
addition  to  elements  commonly  found  in  other  heterodox  programs,  the  Yugoslav
one  included  a  financial  and  industrial  restructuring  cum  privatization
component  that  was  supposed  to  affect  most  of  the  Yugoslav  economic  system,
93 The dollar  value  of the  stock  of domestic  currency  and  sight  deposits
was  $3.7  billion  in  December  1989. Thus,  the  level  of  reserves  would  be
sufficient  to  cover  a  large  portfolio  shift  out  of  domestic  assets.56
although  this  component  had  not  been fully  worked  out  at the  start  of  the
prOgram.
The incomes  policy  consisted  of a  six-month  freeze  on the  exchange  rate,
on  nominal  wages and  on the  priese  of a  aet  of  goods  (mostly  in the  areas  of
energy  and  transportation)  that  accounted  for  20  percent  of the  consumer  price
index.  The  prices  of the  other  goods  and services  remained  completely  free.
Tho exchango  rate  was frozen  at 7  nw  Dinars  per  deutechemark  (DM)  right  after
a devaluation  of 20  percent  on  December  18.  The  devaluations  preceding  the
program  were supposed  to have  corrected  the  overvaluation  that  had occurred  in
the  second  half of 19899  but  they  were rapidly  eroded  by the  price  increases
that followed  (figure  2-2)'4.  Moreover,  there  was no attempt  to use  a  larger
real  devaluation  to neutralize  the impact  of the introduction  of currency
convertibility  and  the  reduction  iu  import  restrictions.
The  overnment  froze  nominal  wages  in  December  at  the  November  levels
adjusted  for  a  20  percent  increase.  Although  it  was  known  that  the  freeze
could  cause  a  substantial  erosion  in real  wages,  they  actually  reached  their
highest  level  of the  decade  in the  second  half  of 1989  (figure  2-2). Thus,  it
was felt  that a larger  initial  correction  of nominal  wages  was  not  needed
before  the freeze. The  prices  of energy,  transportation  and some  other  goods
were frozen  on December  18 after  a  series  of adjustments  in November  and  the
first  half of December. As with the  exchange  rate,  the level  of the  price
adjustments  seems  to  have  been based  on an expectation  of rapidly  declining
rates  of inflation  after  the  program.
The  fiscal  policy  component  of the  program  consisted  basically  in  the
assumption  of several  non-traditional  expenditures  by the  budgets  of the
federation  and the  republics  and  the  maintenance  of a small  budgetary  surplus.
The  non-traditional  expenditdres  included  the  servicing  of foreign  liabilities
of the  National  Bank of  Yugoslavia,  interest  subsidies  to agricu  ture,
transfers  to the  bank restructuring  program 9 transfers  to the  social  safety
net, and  coverage  of some  enterprise  arrears.
The  overall  expansion  of fiscal  expenditures  and  maintenance  of the
budgetary  surplus  required  an increase  in tax  revenues  of approximately  5
percent  of  gross  social  product  (GSP).  The  increase  in  revenues  was  expected
to  come  partly  from  exogenous  increases  in  taxation  (3.5  percent  of  GSP)
resulting  from  the  introduction  of  a  new  federal  sales  tax,  higher  customs
duties  and  unspecified  increases  in .he  republics'  tax  rates,  and  partly  from
endogenous  increases  in  real  tax  revenues  resulting  from  the  stabilization
itself  (1.5  percent  of GSP)--the  inverse  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  (Olivera  1967;
and  Tanzi  1977).  Estimation  of the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  was complicated  by
the  constant  changes  in  the  tax  rates  in  the 1980s,  designed  mostly  to offset
the inflationary  erosion  of real  tax  revenues. In addition,  in 1989  a  partial
indexation  mechanism  was applied  to the  collection  of the  basic  sales  tax.
Monetary  policy  consisted  essentially  of a freeze  on the  nominal  stock  of
the  central  bank's  net domestic  assets,  while  also  allowing  the  central  bank
to  monetize  the  foreign  exchange  inflows  resulting  from  the  program. However,
it should  also  be noted  that  there  was a  substantial  real  increase  in the
central  bank's  domestic  credits  and  base  money  during  December  1989  (figure
34 However,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  relative  to  December  1989  in
figure  3 understates  the  real  devaluation  that  occurred  right  before  the
freeze,  since  it is  measured  by the  average  exchange  rates  in  December
adjuoted  by the  CPIs in  Yugoslavia  and  abroad.
s'  Those  measures  succeeded  in  maintaining  the  ratio  of fiscal  revenues
to GSP at around  35 percent  during  the  second  half  of the 1980s.57
2.5).  Thus9 monetary  policy  was less  restrictive  at the  very start  of the
program  than  might  have  seemed  at a first  examination.
Finally,  the  restructuring  cum  privatization  component  included  various
measures  that  were still  being  developed  or  were running  into  problems  with
implementation.  For instance,  although  the  program  called  for  the  financial
restructuring  of the  commercial  banks  and  the  commitment  of fiscal  resources
for  this  purpose,  the  agency  that  presumably  was to lead  the  bank
restructuring  program  was created  only in  mid-1990.
On the side  of enterprise  reform,  it  was finally  decided  that  the  program
would  not  provide  financing  for  loss-makers  out  of budgetary  resources. It
was expected  that the  program  would  therefore  result  in  a large  number  of
bankruptcies. To prevent  enterprises  from  circumventing  the lack  of financing
by lending  to each  other,  the  government  introduced  strict  enforcement  of the
gayments  rules  on January  1, 1990. The  rules  stated  that  enterprises  which
ad not  met their  obligations  within  60 days  would  be declared  bankrupt  and
closed. Enforcement  of this  rule  was possible  because  of a clearing  system
that  centralized  the  payments  among  enterprises  and  banks.
Although  the decision  to force  inefficient  enterprises  to bankruptcy  was
in  principle  worthy  of praise,  the  strategy  to deal  with bankrupt  enterprises
and  the  accompanying  institutional  and  legal  framework  was still  incomplete.
Regional  institutions  that  would  presumably  be placed  in charge  of
restructuring  and  privatization  had  not  yet  been created. In addition,
although  the  program  included  the  commitment  of fiscal  support  to a social
safety  net, the  amount  of required  resources  seems  to  have been
underestimated.
First  Results  of the  1990  Program
Although  it is too  early  to  make a final  judgment  on the  1990  program,
it is  possible  to assess  the  initial  results  and  to identify  the  problems. As
shown  in  table  2.2  and  figure  2-59  the  first  point  to be  made is  the  program's
success  in  halting  inflation  during  the  first  semester  without  recourse  to
widespread  price  controls. The  index  measuring  variations  in the  retail
prices  by calendar  month (computed  since  December  1989)  shows  that the  decline
in inflation  at the  start  of the  program  was  actually  more pronounced  than  the
classical  index  suggests. However,  table  2-2  also  indicates  a revival  of
inflationary  pressures  after  July.
Industrial  production  fell  by 10  percent  in 1990,  while  GDP  fell  by 7.5
percent. However,  these  figures  might  overstate  the  recessionary  impact  of
the  program. As shown  in figure  2-6,  economic  activity  in the  socialized
sector,  which  was unusually  strong  in the  first  half  of 1989,  had already
weakened  considerably  in  the second  half  of that  year.  In addition,  the
stability  of electricity  production  and  the  creation  of large  numbers  of small
private  sector  enterprises  during  1990  may indicate  that  production  in the
private  sector  (not  fully  captured  in the  statistics)  was not  affected  to the
same  degree.58
Table  2.2
Monthly  Variations  of  Retail  Prices,  Dec 1989-Feb  1991
(In  Z)
Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb
(A)  59  42  13  5  3  0  0  2  3  7  8  3  3  5  10
(B)  64  17  8  3  0  0  0  5  2  11  10  na  na  na  na
Notes:  (A)  Classical  Index,  computed  from  mid-month  to  mid-month.
(B)  Supplementary  Index,  computed  from  beginning  to end  of  month.
Source:  Federal  Institute  of Statistics.
In spite  of the  decline  in  output,  the  increase  in the  real  tax  revenues
of the  federation  was impressive  (figure  2-6). As mentioned,  the increase
reflects  both endogenous  and  exogenous  factors. Total  revenues  rose less  in
real  terms,  however,  a reflection  in  part of the  difficulty  of collecting
taxes  from  an economy  in recession  and the  absence  of significant  exogenous
tax  adjustments  at the  local  level. Although  the  public  sector  overaIl
generated  a  small  surplus  in the  first  nine  months  of 1990,  a  development  that
caused  concern  was the  rapid  growth  of traditional  expenditures  by the
federation,  including  the  wages  of federal  employees,  as they absorbed
resources  that  should  ideally  have  been  channelled  to the  restructuring
programs.
The accumulation  of reserves  was indeed  substantial--US$4  billion  between
December  1989  and September  1990--and  the  stock  of reserves  rose to  more than
US$10  billion,  or 60  percent  of the  gross  external  debt.  On the side  of the
current  account,  the freezing  of the  exchange  rate  and  the  introduction  of
convertibility  led  to a rapid  recovery  in the  level  of  workers'  remittances
starting  in  the last  days of  December. On the  side  of the  capital  account,
the  same  factors,  combined  with the  imposition  of tight  controls  on domestic
credit,  led  enterprises  to repatriate  foreign  exchange  assets  previously  held
abroad.
These  foreign  exchange  inflows  were the  fundamental  source  of the
expansion  in  base  money during  the  first  months  of the  program  (table  2-3).
After the  December  "blip"  (partly  the  result  of increased  inflows)  and  the
January "crunch,"  base  money expanded  in  keeping  with the  increase  in
National  Bank of  Yugoslavia'e  net foreign  assets. The result  was a  real
increase  of 70 percent  in  the stock  of  base  money  between  December  1989  and
September  1990 (measured  by calendar  inflation).
The  reshuffling  of the  portfolios  of asset-holders  at the  start  of the
program  is shown  clearly  in table  2-4.  During  the first  three  quarters,  the
increase  in  net foreign  ansets  is accompanied  by a  rapid  increase  in  MI
(driven  especially  by currency). The  growth  of Dinar  time  deposits  was  much59
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slower,  remaining  actually  below  the  rate  of  inflation.  Finally,  the  stock  of
foreign  exchange  deposits  was  essentially  stable.  The  fact  that  households
did  not  convert  their  foreign  exchange  deposits  into  Dinar  deposits  could
reflect  an  initial  lack  of  confidence  in  the  program.  In  the  Israeli
stabilization  program,  the  conversion  of  dollar-linked  deposits  into  domestic
deposits  constituted  a  basic  source  of  non-inflationary  monetary  creation
(Liviatan  1988).
Of  course,  the  evaluation  of  portfolio  shifts  resulting  from  the  program
has  also  to  consider  the  repatriation  of  foreign  exchange  assets  held
reviously  abroad  by  enterprises  and  the  conversion  of  German Marks  and Eollare  held  "under  the  mattress".  The  first  was  shown  to  be  substantial
(around  US$  2  billion),  while  there  is  less  information  about  the  second.
There  are  no  clear  indications  that  monetary  policy  was  unduly
restrictive  at  the  start  of  the  program.  Interest  rates  on  time  deposits  were
around  12-15  percent  per  year,  an  indication  that  liquidity  conditions  were
not  very  tight.' The  level  of  lending  rates  was  much  higher--around  30-35
percent  p.a.,  but  these  high  intermediation  spreads  reflect  to  a  good  extent
the  severe  problem  of  non-performing  loans  in  banks'  portfolios,  rather  than
tight  liquidity.  In  any  case,  the  high  lending  rates  tended  to  aggravate  the
financial  conditions  of  the  enterprises  and  increase  their  financial  distress,
creating  obvious  complications  for  the  program.
Even  though  monetary  policy  did  not  seem  unduly  restrictive,  the
implementation  of  the  program,  combined  with  strict  enforcement  of  the  new
payment  rules,  had a  strong  impact  on enterprises. During  the first  semester
of 1990,  7,000  of  them  fell  into  some  kind  of  arrears,  3,000  were  unable  to
make  their  payments  within  30  days,  and  350  were  declared  bankrupt.  A large
number  of  enterprises  attempted  to  postpone  bankruptcy  by  not  paying  wages.
At  the  end  of  the  first  semester  the  situation  was,  however,  very
differentiated,  with  several  enterprises  increasing  wages  above  the  ceiling
and  several  others  unable  to  make  wage  payments  within  the  ceiling.  It  was
reported  that  a large  number  of  enterprises  did  not  make  any  wage  payments  in
Hay to  avoid  the  60-day  trigger  mechanism  for  bankruptcy.
Table  2.3
Balance  Sheet  of  NBY,  Dec  1989-Dec  1990
(In  Billions  of  Dinars)
Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec
Not  Foreign  Assets  26  44  58  66  39
Net  Domestic  Assets  135  131  131  141  165
Base  Money  26  40  53  71  69
FX  Liabilities  to  Banks  135  135  136  136  135
Source:  NBY
X  However,  the  constancy  of  nominal  rates  raises  doubts  about  its  value
as  an  indicator  of  liquidity.  It  is  possible  that  the  constancy  of  the  free
deposit  rates  reflects  the  maintenance  of  the  discount  rate  at 23  percent  per
year  during  the  first  semester.62
Table  2.4
Monetary  Survey$  Dec  1989-Dee  1990
(in  Billions  of  Dinars)
Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec
Not  Foreign  Assets  -61  -39  -29  -16  -46
Het  Domestic  Assets  306  314  333  355  388
MH  51  75  100  125  127
Dinar  Time  Deposits  42  43  50  57  59
1K  Deposits  152  157  154  157  156
M3  245  275  304  339  342
Sources  NBY
Pressure  to  relax  the  monetary  policy  mounted  during  the  first  semester
of  1990  and  produced  a  relaxation  starting  in  June. The  relaxation  vas
accomplished  mostly  by  implementing  measures  to  increase  the  multiplier,
although  central  bank  credits  also  increased  somewhat.  The  result  was  a  rapid
increase  in  the  stock  of  commercial  bank  credits  after  that  month  (figure  2-
7).  This increase  led  to a further  rise  in  vases  and  a  revival  of
inflationary  pressure  in  the  second  semester.  The  relaxation  of  monetary
policy  also  aborted  the  expected  shake-out  of  the  industrial  sector  by  keeping
loss-makers  afloat  while  allowing  them  to  resume  wage  payments.
Concern  over  the  revival  of  inflation  led  the  central  bank  to  shift  back
to  a  restrictive  monetary  policy  in  early  October.  However,  there  are
indications  that  the  banks  avoided  a  contraction  in  credit  by  not  complying
with  the  reserve  requirements.  A further  indication  of  the  difficulty  the
central  bank  was  having  conducting  monetary  policy  was  the  unusal  episode  of
December  1990,  whereby  one  of  the  regional  branches  of  the  central  bank
reportedly  increased  credits  by  US$1.8  billion  equivalent  of  Dinare  in  order
to  finance  pensions  and  enterprise  wages (The  Economist,  January  12  1990),  a
step  it  took  without  prior  notification  to  the  board  of  governors.
The  increase  in  domestic  credits  did  not  translate  into  monetary
expansion  in  the  fourth  quarter  because  of  the  US$  3  billion  loss  of  foreign
reserves  that  happened  during  the  same  period.  As  shown  in  tables  2.3,  2.4
and  figure  2.7,  the  increase  in  domestic  credits  Was almost  fully  matched  by  a
decrease  in  net  foreign  assets,  resulting  in  roughly  constant  stocks  of  base
money,  M1  and  M3. Thus,  although  there  was  not  a  further  escalation  in
inflation  late  in  the  year,  the  rapid  loss  of  reserves  created  obvious  doubts
about  the  sustainability  of  the  stabilization  program.  The  recognition  that
the  real  exchange  rate  had  become  severely  overvalued  led  to  a  corrective  30
percent  devaluation  in  January  1,  1991. In  addition,  the  convertibility  of
the  Dinar  was  abandoned  in  December,  as  the  government  interrupted  sales  of
foreign  exchange  to  households  in  order  to  prevent  a  further  loss  of  reserves.63
Figure  2.7  Dinar  Credits  and  Ml, 1989-90
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The  devaluation  of January  1, 1991  resulted  in increasing  rates  of
inflation  in January  and  February  (5  and 10  percent,  respectively)#  despite
the  relmposition  of controls  on  wages of lose-making  enterprises  and the
efforts  to reestablish  control  ever  monetary  policy. Furthermores  the
exchange  rate  became  agsai  severely  overvaluted,  as  a  result  of  the  accumulated
increase  in  prices.
Ag  AasessaLn_t  of  the  Mai  Is8gs
The  Yugoslav  program  of 1990  is an additional  example  of an exchange-rate
based  program  lacking  adequate  correction  of domestic  imbalances.  The  program
was  very successful  in the  first  semester,  but  started  to falter  in the  second
half of the  year.  Enterprises  continued  to run  loosest  wgso  increased  beyond
the  ceilings,  fiscal  resources  vere diverted  towards  wage payments  of public
sector  empioyees  and, finally,  monetary  policy  became  largely  accommodating.
Although  the  maintenance  of the.exchange  rate  freeze  and  thet  open  trade
account  prevented  a  further  esacalation  of inflation  late  in the  year,  the
drastic  overvaluation  of the  exchange  rate  and  the  rapid  lose  of reserves
ultimately  forced  the  goverrament  to  make  a  corrective  devaluation  and  to
suspend  the  convertibility  of the  Dinar.
The  challenge  faced  by  policy-makers  in  1991  is  to  avoid  the  reemer  ence
of  an  exchange  rate-wagea-prices  spiral.  The  only  solution  to  this  problem  is
a  return  to  the  discipline  of  the  f4ret  semester  of  1990,  including  the
relnstitution  of some  kind of enforceable  wage  policy. Although  tfie  measures
taken  in eal  1991  are  a  step  in the  right  direction,  the  prospects  for  their
sustained  %Ieplmentation  are  still  unclear,  depending  on  a  nigh  degree  of
consensus  among  the  various  republics.
Fiscal  policy  also  needs  to be strengthened  to support  the  restructuring
programg since  thea  initial  fiscal  cammitments  to the  reforms  were clearly
Insufficient. For  instance,  the  resources  allocated  to the social  pro ram
would  clearly  have been  inadequate  had  loses-makers  really  been forced  Into
bankruptcy. Final  estimates  of the  quality  of the  portfolios  of the
c o3rcial banks  also  indicated  the  need for  more fiscal  support  for  the64
financial  restructuring  program.  The  fact  that  the  public  sector  ran  a small
surplus  is  almost  completely  irrelevant,  as  the  Imbalances  in  the  YugoSlav
economy  were  never  located  in  the  non-financial  public  sector  but  rather  in
other  sectors  of the  economy.
Events  in  the  second  semester  of  1990  also  indicate  that,  for  the
stabilization  to  be  succeseful,  there  muot  be  much  faster  progress  in  the  area
of  enterprise  and  bank  restructuring  and  privatization.  To  some  extent,  the
slow  progress  reflects  institutional  and  human  resource  constraints  on
implementation  of  the  restructuring  effort.  It  also  reflects  the  absence  of
adequate  fiscal  commitment  to  the  reforms.  Finally,  it  reflects  insufficient
political  resolve  to  deal  effectively  with  the  loss-makers  and  the  asaociated
increase  in  unemployment.  Until  these  problems  are  effectively  tackled,
however,  the  prospects  for  stabilization  and  growth  will  be  highly  uncertain.65
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